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BALANCING PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, AND





The ongoing transition from paper medical files to electronic health
records will provide unprecedented amounts of data for biomedical re-
search, with the potential to catalyze significant advances in medical
knowledge. But this potential can be fully realized only if the data availa-
ble to researchers is representative of the patient population as a whole.
Thus, allowing individual patients to exclude their health information, in
keeping with traditional notions of informed consent, may compromise the
research enterprise and the medical benefits it produces.
This Article analyzes the tension between realizing societal benefits from
medical research and granting individual preferences for privacy. It argues
for a shift in the conceptual and regulatory frameworks that govern bi-
omedical research. When studies involve electronic record review rather
than human experimentation, the traditional, autonomy-dominated model
should give way to one that emphasizes the common good. In record-
based studies, the limited benefits of individual informed consent come at
too high a cost-difficult administrative burdens, significant expenses, and
a tendency to create selection biases that distort study outcomes. Other
mechanisms can better protect data subjects' privacy and dignitary interests
without compromising research opportunities.
In this Article, we formulate a novel, multi-faceted approach to achieve
these ends. This approach recognizes that technical means for achieving
identity concealment and information security are necessary but not suffi-
cient to protect patients' medical privacy and to foster public trust while
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facilitating research. Hence, we call for supplementing such means with (1)
an oversight process that is tailored to record-based research and applies
even to de-identified patient records, which are currently exempt from scru-
tiny, and (2) public notice and education about the nature and potential
benefits of such research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE shift from hard-copy medical files to electronic health records
(EHR) systems is transforming medical research in the United
States.' One of the great promises of EHR technology is its dra-
matic potential to expand opportunities for biomedical research.2 Digi-
tizing medical files opens new frontiers for record-based research because
electronic searches and computer analysis permit fast and inexpensive
1. David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The "Meaningful Use" Regulation for
Electronic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010).
2. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRANSFORMING HEALTHCARE THROUGH SECON-
DARY USE OF HEALTH DATA 3 (2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/healthcare/
publications/secondary-health-data.jhtml; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a
Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 117-19 (2008); Charles Safran, Toward a National Framework for
the Secondary Use of Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White
Paper, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 1, 2 (2007).
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data synthesis. 3 EHR systems will enable the creation of sizeable record
databases or networks of smaller databases that facilitate large-scale stud-
ies.4 Researchers could pose queries to databases that include very large
numbers of patients with diverse demographics who have been treated in
different clinical settings over long periods of time.5 This wealth of infor-
mation could yield significant discoveries concerning the effectiveness of
various treatments. 6 The secondary use of health data 7 could thus pro-
mote Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) 8 and help fill signifi-
cant gaps in medical knowledge.
But EHR-based research also raises new questions. Traditionally, a
paramount principle of biomedical research ethics is human subject au-
tonomy, which is realized through informed consent. 9 The regulatory re-
quirement of informed consent dictates that researchers supply potential
participants in biomedical research with information about the antici-
pated benefits and risks of each research project so that the potential
participants can make educated decisions about whether to enroll. 10 In-
dividuals must be free to decline to participate in studies if they so
choose, and federal regulations provide detailed guidance concerning the
contents of informed consent forms."1
This paradigm, however, is a poor fit for research based on EHRs.
EHR systems' enormous potential to transform medical research has gen-
erated significant debate about the appropriate extent of regulatory pro-
3. See Abel N. Kho et al., Electronic Medical Records for Genetic Research: Results of
the eMERGE Consortium, 3 Sci. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 79rel, 5 (2011), available at http://
stm.sciencemag.org/content/3/79/79rel.abstract; Mark G. Weiner & Peter J. Embi, Toward
Reuse of Clinical Data for Research and Quality Improvement: The End of the Beginning?,
151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 359, 359-60 (2009).
4. JEFFREY BROWN ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY,
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS FOR NETWORK PROTOTYPES AND COOPERATIVE TO CONDUCT
POPULATION-BASED STUDIES AND SAFETY SURVEILLANCE 2-3 (2009), available at http://
www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/54/150/2009_0728DE-
cIDE_- DesignSpecNetCoopPopSafety.pdf; Til Sturmer et al., Nonexperimental Compara-
tive Effectiveness Research Using Linked Healthcare Databases, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGY 298, 299
(2011).
5. Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect Privacy of Health Information
While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH An'. 2082, 2087
(2010).
6. Id.
7. Secondary use can be defined as "non-direct care use of ... [data] including but
not limited to analysis, research, quality/safety measurement, public health, payment, pro-
vider certification or accreditation, and marketing and other business including strictly
commercial activities." Safran, supra note 2, at 4.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A. (reviewing CER).
9. COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE, IOM, BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IM-
PROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 247 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
IOM REPORT] (noting that "[t]he principle of autonomy currently dominates the ethical
landscape" for clinical research).
10. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
11. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2010).
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tections for human subjects in studies that are solely record-based.12 Are
consent requirements barriers to conducting effective research? If
human subjects will not undergo experimentation in the course of the
study, and researchers will examine only their medical records, do the
subjects really need the full panoply of regulatory protections? Does in-
formed consent make sense in the context of EHR database research? Is
the cost of extensive regulation too high?
At the same time, one might also ask whether EHR research actually
requires more, rather than less, regulatory protection. Computerization
of health information poses new risks of privacy breaches that did not
exist when paper files could simply be locked away. 13 In addition, data
subjects whose records are used in research without their consent might
arguably suffer other dignitary harms. Harms to dignity include not only
privacy violations, but also group stigmatization due to research findings,
inability to control whether one's records will be used for objectionable
purposes, and a lack of opportunity to share in profits acquired by data
users.14
This Article employs an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon the
legal, bioethics, and informatics literature to develop a full understanding
of the regulatory, ethical, and technical complexities of EHR data use.
Part I of the Article provides background information. It describes ex-
isting initiatives to create EHR research databases and discusses the reg-
ulations that govern EHR-based research. Part II evaluates the benefits
and potential harms of EHR research. Part III analyzes the concept of
informed consent and argues that a requirement of informed consent is
inappropriate for record-based research. For the sake of simplicity, we
use the terms EHR and EHR systems to designate electronic health
records and the systems in which they operate, though we mean for EHR
to be synonymous with what others call the electronic medical record
(EMR).15 It is also important to emphasize that this Article focuses on
12. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 33-35; Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in
Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1798-1801
(2010); Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective Regulatory Framework for
Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health Information, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 737, 752-58 (1999); Franklin G. Miller, Research on Medical Records
Without Informed Consent, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 564 (2008).
13. Mark A. Rothstein, Improve Privacy in Research by Eliminating Informed Con-
sent? IOM Report Misses the Mark, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 507, 509-11 (2009).
14. Daniel Kim et al., A Physician's Role Following a Breach of Electronic Health
Information, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 30, 31 (2010) ("dignitary harms... may result when a
patient's autonomy is undermined"); Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to
Protect Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOEThICS 3, 6-7 (2010). See also discussion
infra Part III.B.
15. Peter Garrett & Joshua J. Seidman, EMR vs EHR-What is the Difference?,
HEALTHITBuzz (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://www.healthit.govfbuzz-blog/electronic-
health-and-medical-records/emr-vs-ehr-difference/ ("Some people use the terms "elec-
tronic medical record" and "electronic health record" (or "EMR" and "EHR") inter-
changeably. But here at the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology (ONC), you'll notice we use electronic health record or EHR almost
exclusively.").
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record-based medical research rather than interventional research. Re-
cord-based research only involves review of existing patient records,
which we assume will be entirely electronic in the future. By contrast,
interventional research involves physical or psychological testing, and
thus experimentation on human beings.16
This Article makes several important contributions. Part IV argues for
a change in conceptual framework that rejects the primacy of autonomy
and informed consent in the context of non-interventional research. In
light of past research abuses, such as the Nazi concentration camp experi-
ments and the infamous Tuskegee syphilis trial,17 it is not surprising that
the major research ethics codes emphasize human subject autonomy, the
avoidance of individual harm, and consent. 18 But electronic-database
queries were not part of those prior atrocities, and they present a drasti-
cally diminished risk of gross abuses that will inflict acute physical or
mental pain; thus, in the context of record-based research, autonomy
should be secondary to the common good. 19 This Article explains that
advancing the common good will require concessions from both data sub-
jects and the health care industry.
The many obstacles that hinder the attainment of informed consent in
large-scale, record-based studies further justify a change in conceptual
framework. The consent process can be extremely burdensome and
costly and can distort research results by introducing selection bias.20
This Article thoroughly explains and illustrates how different forms of
selection bias can impact a variety of study types. 21 Furthermore, while
informed consent provides subjects with a choice, it does not provide
them with any added protection against privacy breaches, which are the
focus of most commentators' concern.22
In Part V, this Article formulates several practical recommendations
that seek to balance the individual interests of those whose records will
be used in research with societal needs to maximize the potential for
medical discoveries and achieve improvements in human health. To ad-
dress apprehension about privacy, this Article analyzes two identity con-
cealment techniques. One option is to create large databases exclusively
16. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 19 (differentiating between clinical trials and
information-based research).
17. Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional
Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 730-31 (2001).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
19. Many articles describe the tension between these values. See, e.g., Don E. Detmer,
Your Privacy or Your Health-Will Medical Privacy Legislation Stop Quality Health Care?,
12 INT'L J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 1, 1 (2000); Miller, supra note 12, at 562; Khadija
Robin Pierce, Comparative Architecture of Genetic Privacy, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
89, 92 (2009); Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduction to
the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 482
(2000).
20. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
22. See Peddicord et al., supra note 5, at 2,087 ("Consent is, at best, a rough proxy for
protection from privacy harm.").
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for research that would include only EHRs that have been de-identi-
fied.23 A second approach is secure statistical analysis of distributed
databases, which allows researchers to query the EHR databases of medi-
cal facilities or trusted aggregators, but enables them to receive only sum-
mary statistics in response. 24 Although not all studies can utilize these
techniques, the two identity concealment mechanisms will work well in
many cases.
Second, data subjects should be protected through additional oversight.
We make the novel recommendation that all research protocols, including
those involving only de-identified data, which are currently exempt from
scrutiny,25 be reviewed and monitored by an ethics board with expertise
in record-based research. The degree of oversight should depend on the
extent to which records contain identifiers that can be linked to specific
patients. Research using identifiable records should be subject to a thor-
ough approval process, and protocols in which patients' identities will be
concealed should undergo a streamlined registration process. All studies
should be subject to continuing review and potential unannounced audits.
In addition, security safeguards for electronic databases should be
bolstered.26
Third, this Article emphasizes the need for notification and education
in lieu of consent for EHR-based research. Notification and education,
like consent, can demonstrate researchers' respect for human subjects
and promote a sense of autonomy. 27 Transparency and accountability on
the part of researchers should prevent data subjects from suffering seri-
ous research abuses and should inspire enthusiasm about biomedical re-
search. Furthermore, armed with knowledge and a political voice,
informed members of the public can seek to influence elected officials to
reverse objectionable policies through the legislative process.
II. BACKGROUND
EHR research databases are not a futuristic idea-they are fast becom-
ing a reality. This Part provides background information concerning con-
temporary efforts to build EHR resources for research purposes. It also
discusses the federal oversight structure for record-based research.
A. EXISTING INITIATIVES TO CREATE EHR RESEARCH DATABASES
A variety of initiatives are already underway to create large databases
of EHRs or networks of smaller databases, called federated networks,2 8
23. See discussion infra Part VI.A.1.
24. See discussion infra Part VI.A.3.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.
26. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
27. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 266 (stating that one of the primary aims of consent
is to "provide respect for the person").
28. A federated network can be defined as one that "links geographically and organi-
zationally separate databases to allow a single query to pull information from multiple
databases while maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of each database." WILSON D.
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that can be used for research purposes. We describe below a sample of
projects that the federal government, states, and private industry have
undertaken.
For many years, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) researchers
have used records collected from particular VA facilities or consolidated
at a regional level.29 The VA is now working to create a nationwide cen-
tralized data repository of de-identified patient charts.30 In 2009, another
major health care system, Kaiser Permanente, received a multi-million-
dollar federal grant to establish a national electronic research database
that will include health information from 30 million current and past pa-
tients in eight geographic regions. 31
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services created a research
database called the Chronic Condition Data Warehouse (CCW) pursuant
to Section 723 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.32 CCW pro-
vides researchers with information about Medicare and Medicaid benefi-
ciaries, claims for services, and assessment data.33 Researchers must
submit requests through the Research Assistance Data Center and can
ask for either identifiable data files or limited data sets. 34 Requests for
identifiable data are scrutinized to ensure that disclosure will not violate
privacy requirements. 35
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Amendments Act of 2007
authorized the creation of the Sentinel health data network encompassing
records from 100 million individuals.36 The FDA does not plan to estab-
lish its own database. 37 Rather, it intends to send queries concerning po-
tential product safety problems to various participating data holders, such
as health care facilities and insurers who would have their own EHR or
PACE ET AL., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, DIS'RIUTED AMBU-
LATORY RESEARCH IN THERAPEUTIC NETWORK (DARTNET): SUMMARY REPORT ii
(2009), available at http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/products/53/151/
2009_0728DEcIDEDARTNet.pdf.
29. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Study Will Boost Role of Electronic Records in
Care, Research, VA RESEARCH CURRENTS, Aug. 2009, at 3, 7, available at http://
www.research.va.gov/news/research-highlights/records-080309.cfm.
30. Id. (noting that, significantly, the records in the database will include free text,
such as doctors' notes, that is changed into structured data).
31. Press Release, Kaiser Permanente, National Institutes of Health Awards More
Than $54 Million to Kaiser Permanente to Conduct Health Research (Oct. 12, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.dor.kaiser.org/external/dorexternal/news/pressreleases/
press-release.aspx?id=3361.
32. About Chronic Condition Data Warehouse, CHRONIC CONDITION DATA WARE-
HOUSE, http://www.ccwdata.org/about/index.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
33. Id.
34. Requesting CMS Data, RESEARCH DATA ASSISTANCE CENTER, http://
www.resdac.org/Medicare/requesting-data.asp (last modified Oct. 11, 2011).
35. Id.
36. Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food and Drug Administration to Require Data
Access and Control Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 67, 67
(2010); FDA's Sentinel Initiative-Transforming How We Monitor The Safety of FDA-Regu-
lated Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/FDAsSentinellni-
tiative/ucm2007250.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter FDA's Sentinel Initiative].
37. FDA's Sentinel Initiative, supra note 36.
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claims databases. 38 Using automated mechanisms, the data holders
would assess their records and send summary responses to the FDA.39
At the state level, the California Office of Statewide Health Planning
& Development established a database of inpatient hospital discharge
data. 40 Within thirty days of discharge, hospitals must report a large
number of details, including diagnoses, treatments, and drug intake.41 Se-
lected datasets that do not directly identify patients are available for
purchase by the public and thus could be used for research.42
In the private sector, Geisinger Health Systems established a company
called MedMining that extracts EHR data, de-identifies it, and offers it to
researchers. 43 MedMining asserts on its website that its customers in-
clude numerous major pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotech cus-
tomers.44 The data sets it delivers to customers feature "lab results, vital
signs, medications, procedures, diagnoses, lifestyle data, and detailed
costs" from both inpatient and outpatient settings. 45
Yet another initiative is the Distributed Ambulatory Research in Ther-
apeutics Network (DARTNet), a federated network of EHR data from
eight large organizations serving over 400,000 patients.46 DARTNet is
funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). 47
For each DARTNet member organization, relevant clinical information is
captured in a standardized database and then transferred to another
database that presents de-identified data for query access through a se-
cure web-portal. 48 DARTNet researchers query the de-identified feder-
ated databases, consisting of data from EHRs, laboratories, imaging
centers, pharmacies, and billing systems, though the patient EHRs them-
selves never leave the clinical sites at which they are stored.49
Other agencies and organizations are creating electronic registries and
databases to focus on specific disease categories and to support research
through data sharing. These include the Cancer Biomedical Informatics
Grid,50 the Interagency Registry for Mechanically Assisted Circulatory
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Inpatient Hospital Discharge Data, CAL. DIABETES PROGRAM, http:/
www.caldiabetes.org/content-display.cfm?contentlD=487&CategorieslD=31 (last updated
Nov. 18, 2010).
41. Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L.
& MED. 586, 615 (2010).
42. Id.
43. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 13; Welcome to MedMining,
MEDMINING, http://www.medmining.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
44. Welcome to MedMining, supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. PACE ET AL., supra note 28, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. About caBIG, NAT'L CANCER INST., https://cabig.nci.nih.gov/overview/ (last modi-
fied July 2, 2011) (stating that the initiative's goal is to "[b]uild or adapt tools for collecting,
analyzing, integrating, and disseminating information associated with cancer research and
care.").
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Support,51 the Extracorporeal Life Support Organization, 52 and the
United Network for Organ Sharing. 53
These few examples illustrate the increasing use and importance of
EHR databases for research purposes. The law does not ignore the use
of medical records in research and addresses its permissibility in key fed-
eral regulations.
B. EHR-BASED RESEARCH AND THE LAW
Ordinarily, biomedical research protocols require institutional review
board (IRB) approval, 54 and patients must authorize the release of iden-
tifiable information to researchers under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPPA) Privacy Rule. 55 By contrast, research
using de-identified EHRs can be conducted with few regulatory burdens;
research involving solely de-identified records need not be approved by
an IRB56 and is not subject to coverage by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.57
Consequently, health care providers, including clinicians and medical fa-
cilities, can disclose de-identified data to researchers without obtaining
patient consent or applying HIPAA's privacy safeguards to the de-identi-
fied data. This section reviews provisions of the federal research regula-
tions and the HIPAA Privacy Rule that apply to EHR-based research.
1. The Federal Research Regulations
The federal regulations that require IRB review and participant con-
sent, known as the Common Rule, 58 cover only research on human sub-
jects, and define a human subject as "a living individual about whom an
investigator... obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction with
the individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information. ' 59 Because of the
very minimal risk of harm to participants, the regulations specifically ex-
empt research "involving the collection or study of existing data, docu-
ments, [or] records ... if the information is recorded by the investigator
in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through
51. INTERMACS Description, INTERMACS, http://www.uab.edu/ctsresearch/in-
termacs/description.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (explaining that analysis of the col-
lected data is expected to improve patient care and to "influence future research").
52. ELSO Registry Information Data Policy, EXTRACORPOREAL LIFE SUPPORT ORG.,
http://www.elso.med.umich.edu/DataRequests.html (last updated Oct. 12, 2010) (providing
details concerning the collection of data with most identifiers removed, submission of que-
ries, and release of query results to members in aggregate form).
53. Data, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/donation/in-
dex.php?topic=data (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (discussing the creation of UNet, an online
database system that "contains data regarding every organ donation and transplant event
occurring in the United States since 1986").
54. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2010).
55. Id. § 164.508(b)(3)(i).
56. Id. § 46.101(b)(4).
57. See id. § 160.103 for the definition of "Protected Health Information."
58. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'), U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/in-
dex.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102.
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identifiers linked to the subjects."'60 The regulations provide no details as
to which identifiers need to be removed to render data de-identified. 61
The Common Rule provides IRBs with flexibility and allows them to
exercise discretion in appropriate circumstances. IRBs may waive the re-
quirement of informed consent if they find that a study involves no more
than minimal risk for subjects and entails no procedure for which consent
would be required in the treatment setting.62 Accordingly, even record-
based research involving personally identifiable health information may
be exempted from the informed consent mandate.
Research utilizing a database of EHRs that have been previously de-
identified would not be covered by the research regulations.63 Further-
more, the applicability of the federal regulations to research involving
medical records rather than interaction with patients depends on the
method by which data is recorded by the investigator. 64 Consequently,
even research through a service that queries EHRs with identifiable pa-
tient data but presents results to researchers in summary, non-identifiable
form would most likely be exempt from IRB review. At most, however,
such project proposals would be sent to IRBs, would be deemed to pose
only minimal risk to subjects, and would consequently require no in-
formed consent process.
2. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally prohibits disclosure of individually
identifiable health information without patient consent, unless the infor-
mation is transmitted for purposes of treatment, payment, or health care
operations.65 The HIPPA Privacy Rule's application to research activities
is analyzed in this section.
a. De-Identified Information
Like the Common Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule covers only "individ-
ually identifiable health information."' 66 Thus, the Rule does not prohibit
covered entities 67 from disclosing de-identified data to third parties, in-
cluding researchers. The regulations provide that information can be
considered de-identified: (1) if an appropriate expert determines that
60. Id. § 46.101(b)(4).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 46.117(c).
63. Human Research Protections Frequently Asked Questions: Can I Analyze Data
That Are Not Individually Identifiable, Such as Medication Databases Stripped of Individual
Patient Identifiers, for Research Purposes Without Having to Apply the HHS Protection of
Human Subjects Regulations?, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://an-
swers.hhs.gov/ohrp/questions/7284 (last updated Dec. 30, 2010).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4).
65. Id. § 164.506.
66. Id. § 160.103 (defining "protected health information").
67. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses,
health care providers who transmit health information electronically for particular pur-
poses (generally claims or benefits activities), and their business associates. Id.
§§ 160.102-160.103; 42 U.S.C. § 17931 (2006).
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there is only a "very small" risk that the information could be re-identi-
fied, and (2) the expert documents his or her analysis.68 This criterion is
known as the HIPAA "statistical standard. ' 69 In the alternative, informa-
tion is deemed de-identified according to the HIPAA Privacy Rule's "safe
harbor" provision 70 if the following eighteen identifiers are removed:
(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent geocodes,
except for the initial three digits of a zip code if, according to the cur-
rent publicly available data from the Bureau of the Census:
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with the
same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and
(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic units
containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000;
(C) All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to
an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date
of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates (including year)
indicative of such age, except that such ages and elements may be ag-
gregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
(D) Telephone numbers;
(E) Fax numbers;
(F) Electronic mail addresses;
(G) Social security numbers;
(H) Medical record numbers;
(I) Health plan beneficiary numbers;
(J) Account numbers;
(K) Certificate/license numbers;
(L) Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate
numbers;
(M) Device identifiers and serial numbers;
(N) Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
(0) Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
(P) Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
(0) Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.71
The requirements for de-identification under this provision are far
more specific than those of the Common Rule. It is, therefore, possible
68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1).
69. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1737 (2010).
70. Standard for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182, 53,232 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
71. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). In addition, information will not be considered de-
identified if an entity has "actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in
combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the infor-
mation." Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii).
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that a protocol would be exempt from the Common Rule's consent man-
date because some identifiers will be removed, but would still require
patient authorization under the HIPAA Privacy Rule because not all
eighteen safe harbor identifiers are redacted. 72
b. Other HIPAA Exemptions
The HIPAA Privacy Rule contains several other exceptions that apply
to research use of health data. Covered entities 73 may disclose "limited
data sets" without patient consent if the recipient signs a data use agree-
ment that prohibits re-identification of the data.74 Limited data sets al-
low somewhat more liberal disclosures than the safe harbor provision
because they make three modifications to the eighteen-factor list: disclo-
sure of all elements of dates, including exact birth dates, is permitted, and
while specific addresses must be withheld, patients' towns or cities and
zip codes can be revealed. 75 The limited data set provision also elimi-
nates the catch-all item of "any other unique" identifier.76
In addition, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not protect records of dece-
dents that are used for research purposes.77 Researchers can obtain fur-
ther exemptions with approval of an IRB or privacy board in accordance
with regulatory guidance.78
III. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF RESEARCH
USING EHR DATA
The advent of EHRs has the potential to transform medical research by
enabling investigators to conduct computerized searches that will yield an
unprecedented wealth of information about patient care and treatment
efficacy. By the same token, the prospect of electronic research raises
serious concerns that cannot be ignored. The possible benefits and harms
of EHR-based research are thoroughly analyzed in this part.
A. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EHR-BASED RESEARCH
EHR technology could make an invaluable contribution to medical re-
search because it can facilitate large-scale observational studies that will
fill existing knowledge gaps. Contemporary medical practice involves a
startling amount of guesswork. 79 According to some estimates, as few as
72. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 173.
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1); see also § 164.514(e)(4) (containing details concerning
data use agreements).
75. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(iii).
78. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i). Identifiable medical records may also be used without pa-
tient consent to prepare (but not carry out) research protocols as long as the records do not
leave the facility in which they are stored. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(ii).
79. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 893, 952 (2005) (observing that "[a] great deal of uncertainty exists about the 'best'
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20 to 25% of treatments have been definitively proven effective. 80 In
many instances, physicians initially try particular treatment plans, medi-
cations, or dosages knowing that these will likely need to be changed or
adjusted before the patient receives optimal treatment.81
Both the Obama Administration and the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
have recognized the importance of CER.8 2 The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 defines CER as "research evaluating and
comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and bene-
fits of 2 or more medical treatments, services, and items. ' 83 CER's aim is
to generate improved patient outcomes while maximizing the benefit of
health care expenditures. 84 A 2009 IOM Report similarly emphasized
the need for CER and proposed initial CER priorities.8 5 Such research
could lead to a significant reduction in human suffering, disease-related
death rates, and health care costs.
CER is to be conducted through a wide variety of means, including
both clinical trials and observational studies. 86 Randomized, controlled
clinical trials are considered to be the gold standard of medical studies.87
Experimental clinical studies involve "the collection of data on a process
when there is some manipulation of variables that are assumed to affect
the outcome of a process, keeping other variables constant as far as possi-
ble. '' 88 In a randomized experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to
receive one of the interventions under study (possibly including no inter-
vention). For example, investigators might design a clinical trial to in-
clude two groups to which eligible patients are randomly assigned: one
treatment for particular clinical conditions, and about the 'best' way to perform those
treatments" and that the "efficacy of most medical treatments has never been proven");
Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging The Inferential Gap: The Electronic Health Record and
Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AF. w181, w181 (2007) (discussing the "inferential gap"
between "the paucity of what is proved to be effective for selected groups of patients ver-
sus the infinitely complex clinical decisions required for individual patients").
80. John Casey, Medical Guesswork, BUSINESSWEEK, May 29, 2006, at 72 (asserting
that many "physicians say the portion of medicine that has been proven effective is still
outrageously low - in the range of 20% to 25%").
81. See id.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(e) (2010); Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Facts, Fallacies, and
Politics of Comparative Effectiveness Research: Part I Basic Consideration, 13 PAIN PHYSI-
CIAN, E23, E38-39 (2010).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(a)(2)(A).
84. Id. § 1320e(d)(2)(A); Adam G. Elshaug & Alan M. Garber, How CER Could Pay
for Itself-Insights from Vertebral Fracture Treatments, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1390,
1392-93 (2011); Manchikanti et al., supra note 82, at E39.
85. INST. OF MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
RESEARCH 1-3 (2009), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2009/
ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities.aspx.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(2)(A).
87. Friedrich K. Port, Role of Observational Studies Versus Clinical Trials in ESRD
Research, 57 KIDNEY INT'L S-3, S-3 (2000), available at http://www.nature.com/ki/journall
v57/n74s/full/4491615a.html (stating that "[r]andomized controlled clinical trials have been
considered by many to be the only reliable source for information in health services re-
search"); see also Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REv. 449, 452-54 (2001) (describing different
designs of clinical trials).
88. BRYAN F. J. MANLY, THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH STUDIES 1 (1992).
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group receives Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme (ACE) inhibitors for
heart failure, and the second group receives ACE inhibitors in combina-
tion with a different drug for the same condition.89 The goal of this ex-
perimental study would be to determine which treatment is more
effective as reflected by one or more outcome measures.
By contrast, research can also be accomplished through observational
studies.90 One source defines an "observational study" as "an empiric
investigation of treatments, policies, or exposures and the effects they
cause, but it differs from an experiment in that the investigator cannot
control the assignment of treatments to subjects." 91 Thus, rather than
conducting a controlled experiment, investigators might review the charts
or electronic files of patients receiving different medications or different
types of surgery to treat a particular condition to determine the efficacy
of each approach. 92 For example, in exploring the utility of EHRs for
genetic research, a recent study found that data captured from EHRs
could identify disease characteristics with sufficient accuracy to be used in
genome-wide association studies.93 Observational studies are often con-
ducted when the FDA requires post-marketing studies to verify the safety
of drugs.94
Observational studies, such as reviews of EHR data, are vulnerable to
several criticisms.95 These studies are not randomized, and the absence
of randomization may introduce biases that skew results. 96 For example,
if investigators review only records that come from a particular wealthy,
suburban medical practice, the results derived may not apply to low-in-
come populations with higher levels of stress, poorer diets, and inferior
89. Sharona Hoffman, "Racially-Tailored" Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
395, 400-02 (2005) (describing a clinical trial for heart failure medication).
90. See MANLY, supra note 88, at 1 (explaining that observational studies involve the
collection of data "by observing some process which may not be well-understood"); see
also CHARLES P. FRIEDMAN & JEREMY C. WYATT, EVALUATION METHODS IN BIOMEDI-
CAL INFORMATIcS 369 (2d ed. 2006) (defining observational studies as involving an
"[a]pproach to study design that entails no experimental manipulation" in which
"[i]nvestigators typically draw conclusions by carefully observing ... [subjects] with or
without an information resource").
91. PAUL R. ROSE"BAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES vii (2d ed. 2002).
92. Kjell Benson & Arthur J. Hartz, A Comparison of Observational Studies and Ran-
domized, Controlled Trials, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1878, 1879-83 (2000).
93. Kho et al., supra note 3, at 4-5.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS-IMPLEMENTATON OF
SECTION 505(o)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, 2-7 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/
Guidances/UCM172001.pdf.
95. See Gary Taubes, Do We Really Know What Makes Us Healthy?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2007, at 52 (describing the limitations of observational studies and stating that they
"can only provide what researchers call hypothesis-generating evidence-what a defense
attorney would call circumstantial evidence").
96. See Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878 (stating that "[c]oncern about inherent
bias" in observational studies "has limited their use in comparing treatments"); see also
MANLY, supra note 88, at 4-5.
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access to medical care.97 Similar skewing, however, may occur in inter-
ventional research if the population from which subjects are recruited is
not sufficiently diverse.98 However, there are ways of controlling for the
bias problem in creating (or extracting data from) an EHR database, such
as ensuring that the database is both large enough and drawn randomly
from the EHRs of a diverse patient population. 99
A second concern is that observational study results could be con-
founded by uncontrolled variables because the assignment of different
treatments, including placebos, to patients is not randomized. 100 Thus,
any changes that are observed might be caused not by the intervention of
interest but by factors, such as age or sex, that influence both the treat-
ment patients receive and the outcomes they have. 10 1 If researchers do
not carefully monitor and adjust for these factors, any conclusion con-
cerning the efficacy of the drug at issue is likely to be questionable.
Third, EHR database studies may also be affected by data quality
problems.10 2 Researchers cannot assume that EHR data is completely
accurate. The data in EHRs may be incomplete or erroneous because,
among other reasons, clinicians make typing mistakes, do not have
enough time to create comprehensive and error-free records, or have dif-
ficulty navigating the EHR system.' 0 3 To estimate error rates and magni-
tudes, researchers may need to validate the EHRs of a sample of patients,
which would entail contacting them or their physicians.' 04
Other complications may compromise the quality of EHR data as well.
Medical terminology lacks standardization, and physicians can use the
same abbreviations to mean very different things. 10 5 For example, "MS"
can mean "mitral stenosis," "multiple sclerosis," "morphine sulfate," and
"magnesium sulfate."'01 6 In addition, patients who see doctors at differ-
ent medical facilities whose EHR systems are not interoperable may have
fragmented records and pieces of their medical histories in different
EHRs.107
Problems with the completeness and accuracy of EHR data can be mit-
igated in part through increased use of electronic means for collecting
97. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1 (explaining how informed consent can lead to se-
lection bias).
98. See MANLY, supra note 88, at 4-5.
99. See id. at 16.
100. See id. at 4-5.
101. See id. at 9.
102. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability
and Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1537-45 (2009).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1565-69, 1577.
105. Christopher G. Chute, Medical Concept Representation, in MEDICAL INFORMAT-
Ics: KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND DATA MINING IN BIOMEDICINE 163, 170-71
(Hsinchin Chen et al. eds., 2005).
106. Id. at 170, tbl. 6-1.
107. Barbara Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 70, 88,
93-94 (2011).
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patient data, such as remote patient monitoring.10 8 It must also be recog-
nized that data integrity problems are not unique to observational stud-
ies. Clinical trials are often criticized for design flaws and other
deficiencies.' 0 9 Researchers must be aware of the limitations of their re-
search tools and techniques and strive continuously to improve them.
In fact, observational studies have several advantages over clinical tri-
als.1 10 EHR databases could allow researchers to access vast amounts of
information about patients with diverse demographics collected over a
much longer period of time than that encompassed by clinical trials,
which typically last only a few years.1 ' The data used in observational
studies, consequently, may be far more comprehensive than the data gen-
erated by clinical trials, which often include fewer than 3,000 patients.
1 1 2
Observational studies can also be considerably less costly and time-con-
suming than experimental research because the data used already
exist. 13
In some cases, it is impossible to conduct clinical trials.1 14 This may be
because it is too difficult to recruit a large enough subject population to
yield statistically significant results, such as when the condition is very
rare.115 Clinical studies may also be unrealistic because it would be un-
ethical to conduct them.1 1 6 For example, investigators could not examine
the outcomes of patients who receive the wrong treatment by deliberately
108. Kevin D. Blanchet, Remote Patient Monitoring, 14 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH
127, 128-30 (2008).
109. See, e.g., Lorena Baccaglini et a]., Design and Statistical Analysis of Oral Medicine
Studies: Common Pitfalls, 16 ORAL DISEASES 233, 233-40 (2010); Ron Dagan & George
H. McCracken, Flaws in Design and Conduct of Clinical Trials in Acute Otitis Media, 21
PEDIATRIC INFECrIOUS DISEASES J. 894, 894-901 (2002); Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of
a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 439-50 (2010); Martha Clare Morris & Christine C.
Tangney, A Potential Design Flaw of Randomized Trials of Vitamin Supplements, 305
JAMA 1348, 1348-49 (2011); Stephen D. Simon, Is the Randomized Clinical Trial the Gold
Standard of Research?, 22 J. ANDROLOGY 938, 938-42 (2001).
110. Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878 (citing the advantages of diminished cost,
timeliness, and a broader spectrum of patients).
111. See, e.g., Lynn M. Etheredge, A Rapid-Learning Health System, 26 HEALTH AiF.
w107, will (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilcontent/full1/26/2w07;
Evans, supra note 109, at 446 ("Phase III trials typically last one to four years and may
include 1000 to 10,000 patients of whom only a few hundred patients typically receive the
new drug for more than three to six months."); Louise Liang, The Gap Between Evidence
and Practice, 26 HEALTH AFF. w119, w120 (2007) (asserting that "EHRs have the potential
to take over where clinical trials and evidence-based research leave off, by providing real-
world evidence of drugs' and treatments' effectiveness across subpopulations and over
longer periods of time"); James H. Ware & Mary Beth Hamel, Pragmatic Trials-Guides to
Better Patient Care?, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1685,1685 (2011) (discussing the shortcomings
of clinical trials).
112. Sheila Weiss Smith, Sidelining Safety-The FDA's Inadequate Response to the
IOM, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 960, 961 (2007).
113. Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878 (mentioning "greater timeliness" as an
advantage of observational studies); Port, supra note 87, at S-3, S-4.
114. Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878.
115. See Etheredge, supra note 111, at w107.
116. Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878.
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giving some individuals incorrect medications.117 By contrast, review of
EHR databases could allow for a broader range of research.118 Investiga-
tors could gain access to patient records all over the country, including
those of individuals with very rare illnesses.119 In addition, researchers
could study data relating to actual patients who are treated in a clinical
setting, rather than in the controlled environment of a research trial, and
could analyze care that is of varying quality, including substandard
care.
120
It is not anticipated that EHR-based observational studies will replace
randomized clinical trials.1 21 However, observational studies are an in-
dispensable addition to the research tool kit.122 In the words of one com-
mentator, EHRs "will offer the capacity for real-time learning from the
experience of tens of millions of people and will greatly increase the abil-
ity to generate and test hypotheses."'1 23
B. POTENTIAL HARMS ASSOCIATED WITH EHR-BASED RESEARCH
While the anticipated benefits of EHR-based research are significant,
such research is not devoid of risks. Data subjects may risk privacy viola-
tions as well as other dignitary harms, all of which are addressed in this
part.
1. Privacy
The terms "privacy" and "confidentiality" are at times used inter-
changeably or inconsistently, but the IOM offers illuminating definitions
of these words.1 24 According to the 10M, privacy focuses on the "collec-
tion, storage, and use of personal information" and thus on questions of
access to data.125 Confidentiality concerns the duty to avoid improper
disclosure of information that is conveyed in an intimate relationship. 126
Inappropriate disclosures of EHR data may involve violations of both
privacy and confidentiality. However, for purposes of simplicity, we use
the word "privacy" to encompass all aspects of the concern about data
disclosure.
117. See MANLY, supra note 88, at 13-14.
118. See Etheredge, supra note 111, at w107.
119. See id. at w109.
120. See id. at w109-w116.
121. See id. at w108.
122. See Benson & Hartz, supra note 92, at 1878, 1884 (concluding, based on a litera-
ture review, that "observational studies and randomized, controlled trials usually produce
similar results"); Port, supra note 87, at S-5 (arguing that both observational studies and
clinical studies have their place and complement each other). But see Gordon H. Guyatt et
al., Randomized Trials Versus Observational Studies in Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention,
53 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 167, 173 (2000) (cautioning researchers about the risks of
observational studies and stating that recommendations should be based on randomized
trials whenever possible).
123. Etheredge, supra note 111, at w108.
124. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 16-17.
125. Id. at 16-17, 76.
126. Id. at 76.
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a. Privacy Breach Harms
Once information is digitized, it is vulnerable to privacy breaches re-
sulting from hacking; stolen or misplaced laptops and storage devices; ac-
cidental disclosures, such as e-mails inadvertently sent to the wrong
recipient; or even intentional misconduct. 127 The news media and other
organizations have provided accounts of many such violations during the
last several years. 128 The Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) website lists almost 300 health care providers and insurers that
have reported significant breaches since September of 2009.129
The personal and sensitive information contained in medical records
might be of interest to a large number of parties. 130 Employers wish to
hire healthy workers who will not have productivity and absenteeism
problems or submit costly medical claims for reimbursement.13 1 Various
types of insurers (e.g., life, disability, long-term care) want to find clients
who are low-risk and whose premium payments will exceed claims.132
Lenders are interested in borrowers who can work and earn salaries that
will enable them to pay off their loans. 133
Advertisers and marketers hope to influence doctors' prescribing deci-
sions and patients' medical purchasing choices; political operatives may
hope to use health information to disqualify or embarrass candidates; and
blackmailers or other criminals may seek financial gain through the pos-
session and use of such data.134
If health information contained in research databases can be linked to
the names of data subjects, those with access to the data could theoreti-
cally sell or distribute it to interested third parties. Comprehensive
EHRs will include psychiatric records, reproductive and sexual histories,
HIV status, serious illnesses such as cancer, and much more. 135 Thus,
patients whose information falls into inappropriate hands could face em-
ployment or insurance discrimination; 136 lose financial and other oppor-
tunities; become victims of criminal conduct; or suffer public
embarrassment, though some of these harms may be mitigated by existing
127. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:
Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331,
332-34 (2007).
128. See id. at 332-33; see also IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 95-96 tbl. 2-2; Milt
Freudenheim, Breaches Lead to Push to Protect Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011,
at B1.
129. Health Information Privacy: Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/
breachnotificationrule/breachtool.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Breaches
Affecting).





135. Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records




It is important to note, however, that the danger of electronic privacy
breaches arises as soon as providers convert patients' medical files from
paper format to EHRs, and clinicians do not consult patients about
whether to undertake this transition. To date, data breaches have in fact
generally occurred in the clinical rather than research setting. 38 Further-
more, patients routinely face privacy risks not only because of security
vulnerabilities in EHR systems, but also because of vulnerabilities in their
own computers or other electronic devices, data mining of data sources
such as purchase records, and elicitation of sensitive information directly
from patients by websites such as social networking services. 139 Thus, pa-
tients should not perceive research activities involving EHRs as generat-
ing privacy risks that would otherwise be entirely nonexistent.
b. Privacy and De-Identification
One technique that could reduce privacy risks is de-identification of
records.140 Nevertheless, commentators worry that de-identification does
not provide sufficient protection to data subjects. 141 The potential short-
comings of de-identification are analyzed below.
i. De-Identification Procedures
Some experts question the reliability of contemporary de-identification
techniques. 142 The quality of de-identification may vary among different
EHR systems; de-identification capacity often is not designed into EHR
systems, and, thus, it must be added after data is exported from an EHR
system.143 Different parts of the EHR, such as patient demographics, cli-
nicians' free-text notes, laboratory and imaging reports, and hospitaliza-
tion records, may have to be de-identified separately, and, thus, the
process might be very labor-intensive and time-consuming. 144 Further-
more, a fragmented and complex process could result in many instances
in which identifiers are overlooked and retained in the record. 145 Thus, if
de-identification is not automated, it would need to be assigned to trusted
137. Id.; see also discussion infra Part VI.C.2.
138. See Breaches Affecting, supra note 129.
139. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 41-55 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone
Noveck eds., 2004); Balachander Krishnamurthy & Craig E. Wills, On the Leakage of Per-
sonally Identifiable Information Via Online Social Networks, 40 COMPUTER COMM. REV.
112, 112 (2010).
140. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the application of federal regulations to de-identi-
fied records); see also discussion infra Part VI.A.1 (discussing de-identification techniques).
141. Rothstein, supra note 14, at 5-6.
142. Id. at 5.
143. Id.; see also Ben Wellner et al., Rapidly Re-targetable Approaches to Deidentifica-
tion in Medical Records, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 564, 572 (2007).
144. Rothstein, supra note 14, at 5; see also Ishna Neamatullah et al., Automated De-
identification of Free-Text Medical Records, 8 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAK-
ING 32, 33 (2008), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6947-8-
32.pdf.
145. See supra Part II.B.2.a (listing identifiers discussed in the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
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professionals. In addition, it is possible that a cryptographic key will have
to be retained in case researchers need to conduct follow-up studies that
require re-identification so that data can be linked to specific individu-
als.146 Such a key would need to be carefully safeguarded so that it does
not fall into the hands of potential wrongdoers.
ii. The Possibility of Re-Identification
Experts have found that de-identified information can be re-identified
using publicly available resources, such as voter registration records.
147
The risk may be small, but it exists.
In general, de-identification is based on assumptions that third parties
do not have certain information about data subjects that may facilitate re-
identification; however, adversaries may legally or illegally obtain such
information from a variety of sources and then correlate it to de-identi-
fied records to achieve re-identification. 148 For example, information
about patients' medication purchases or evidence of the web links on
which an individual clicks can be useful for this purpose.14
9
It is estimated that between 63% and 87% of the U.S. population could
be accurately identified based on the three factors of gender, zip code,
and date of birth, without any need for details such as name, social secur-
ity number, or a precise address.' 5 0 Latanya Sweeney, a leading author-
ity, asserts that 0.04% of records that comply with the de-identification
requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule15 1 could be re-identified.'
52
Dr. Sweeney is famous for having identified the health records of Massa-
chusetts Governor William Weld when she was a graduate student in 1996
based on anonymized hospital discharge data that was released to the
public and voter registration information that was also publicly
available.153
146. Patricia Kosseim & Megan Brady, Policy by Procrastination: Secondary Use of
Electronic Health Records for Health Research Purposes, 2 McGILL J.L. & HEALTH 5, 28
(2008).
147. Id. at 28-29; Ohm, supra note 69, at 1703 ("Clever adversaries can often reidentify
or deanonymize the people hidden in an anonymized database.") (emphasis added).
148. GEORGE T. DUNCAN ET AL., STATISTICAL CONFIDENTIALITY: PRINCIPLES & PRAC-
TICE 37 (2011).
149. Id. at 29-31 (discussing use of microdata).
150. Philippe Golle, Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the U.S. Pop-
ulation, in Ass'N FOR COMPUTIVE MACHINERY WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELEC-
TRONIC Soc'Y 77, 77 (2006), available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/-pgolle/papers/
census.pdf; Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at dataprivacy.org/projects/
identifiability/paperl.pdf.
151. See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing de-identification standards under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
152. NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ON ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR USES OF HEALTH
DATA: A STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR "SECONDARY USES" OF ELECTRONICALLY COL-
LECTED AND TRANSMITIED HEALTH DATA 36 n.16 (2007), available at www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
0712211t.pdf.
153. Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with Respect
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 169, 169 (2010).
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A study published in 2010 by Kathleen Benitez and Bradley Malin 154
found that even records that have been de-identified in accordance with
HIPAA Privacy Rule specifications1 55 are potentially vulnerable to re-
identification. The degree of risk varies from state to state and depends
on what demographic information is available to the public through voter
registration records. 156 When all eighteen HIPAA safe harbor provision
identifiers are removed, the percentage of a state's population vulnerable
to unique re-identification was estimated to range from 0.01% to
0.25%.157 When the identifiers permitted by HIPAA for limited data sets
were added in, the risk percentage rose to between 10% and 60%, de-
pending on the state.15 8 In 2011, the same authors published a second
paper in which they assessed their own method of de-identification-con-
sistent with HIPAA's statistical standard. 59 They quantified the risk of
re-identification in this case as ranging "from 0.01% to 0.19%."160
Both of the Benitez and Malin studies make particular assumptions
about the re-identification scheme and the external data used to imple-
ment it.161 They focus on a "marketer attack" using demographic data
about patients, such as that found in voter registration records. 162 In a
"marketer attack," the adversary simply tries to identify as many records
as possible and does not focus on a particular record or subset of
records. 63 The authors also assume that adversaries will use publicly
available data and not engage in illegal activity, such as hacking.164 In
addition, attackers are assumed to be private individuals rather than busi-
ness entities that might have more information about targeted data sub-
jects.165 Needless to say, these assumptions may not apply in actual
attempts at re-identification, and, thus, the risk figures supplied by Beni-
tez and Malin may be misleading.
A recent paper by the Technology Policy Institute, a nonprofit, asserted
that "there is no evidence that re-identification by a true adversary
(somebody other than a researcher or journalist interested in the efficacy
154. Id.
155. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
156. Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 176.
157. Id. at 169.
158. Id.; see also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing limited data sets
and the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
159. Bradley Malin et al., Never Too Old for Anonymity: A Statistical Standard for
Demographic Data Sharing Via the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
Ass'N 3, 3 (2011). The statistical standard is articulated in 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2010)
(stating that information can be considered de-identified if an appropriate expert deter-
mines that there is only a "very small" risk that the information could be re-identified and
documents her analysis).
160. Malin et al., supra note 159, at 7.
161. Id. at 4-5; see also Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 170.
162. Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 170; Malin et al., supra note 159, at 4.
163. Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 170; Malin et al., supra note 159, at 4.
164. Benitz & Malin, supra note 153, at 170.
165. Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 170; Malin et al., supra note 159, at 4.
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of privacy protections) has actually happened."'1 66 The authors asserted
that because re-identification is very difficult to achieve, it may be possi-
ble "only for small populations under unusual conditions.' 167 Still, even
a fraction of a percent of re-identification risk could mean that hundreds
of thousands of Americans' de-identified records would be vulnerable. 68
2. Harms Not Related to Privacy
While the potential for privacy breaches has received significant atten-
tion in the literature, other possible harms to the dignity or autonomy of
patients have raised concerns as well. 169 If patients are not asked to con-
sent to research that involves their EHRs, they will have no opportunity
to determine whether they are willing to accept the risks of dignitary
harms. As Professor Mark Rothstein has argued, these harms include
group stigmatization, inadvertently supporting medical developments
that one finds morally objectionable, and enabling commercial enter-
prises to garner large profits in which data subjects do not share. 170
a. Group Stigmatization
Group stigmatization may occur if researchers find that individuals
with particular ancestry are more vulnerable to a specific illness than
other groups or have better outcomes with treatment that is different
from standard therapy.' 7' For example, the genetic abnormalities
BRCA1 and BRCA2 are associated with an increased risk of breast and
ovarian cancer and are found more commonly in Ashkenazi Jews.' 72
When genetic testing was developed to identify the BRCA1 and BRCA2
mutations, some members of the Jewish community became anxious that
Jews would be perceived as having a flawed genetic makeup or as being
unusually diseased.' 73 Likewise, the FDA's 2005 approval of the drug
BiDil only for African-Americans generated significant concern about
the implications of ethnopharmacology.174 Would race-based prescrip-
tions lead some to assume that African-Americans were biologically dif-
ferent from and measurably inferior to others? 175 Data subjects whose
de-identified information is used in research without their consent will
166. JANE YAKOWITZ & DANIEL BARTH-JONES, TECH. POLICY INST., THE ILLUSORY




168. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.b.
169. See, e.g., Golle, supra note 150, at 77.
170. Rothstein, supra note 14, at 6-7.
171. Id.; see also Sharona Hoffman, "Racially-Tailored" Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U.
L. REV. 395, 423-27 (2005).
172. Roxana Moslehi, BRCAI and BRCA2 Mutation Analysis of 208 Ashkenazi Jewish
Women with Ovarian Cancer, 66 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1259, 1264 (2000).
173. Hoffman, supra note 171, at 423.
174. Id. at 396-97.
175. Id. at 424.
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likely not have opportunities to opt out of studies that could conceivably
lead to stigmatization of groups with which they strongly identify.
b. Moral Objections
Biomedical research could also lead to outcomes that some data sub-
jects find unacceptable. 176 For example, research may reveal that particu-
lar fetal abnormalities can be discovered in-utero, and testing for the
abnormality may ultimately induce parents to abort fetuses that they
would have otherwise kept. 177 A patient who opposes abortion may find
it abhorrent to have her medical file play a role in such research, even if it
is merely subject to an automated query as part of a large database of de-
identified files. Yet, without an informed consent process, she will be
given no choice in the matter.
c. No Share in Commercial Profits
Biomedical research, at its most successful, can enable pharmaceutical
and device manufacturers to enjoy significant monetary rewards. How-
ever, manufacturers achieve commercial success only after the investment
of considerable time and money in product development and then only in
a minority of instances. The cost of bringing a drug from initial clinical
testing to FDA approval has been estimated at $802 million, and the pro-
cess takes an average of 90.3 months. 178 Furthermore, according to a
study of clinical trial data from 2003 to 2010, only 10% of drugs actually
progress from phase one trials to FDA approval.179 However, when med-
ical products are marketed, they can be very lucrative, generating billions
of dollars of revenue,180 and these profits are not shared with the re-
search subjects who participated in the relevant studies.'8 '
Informed consent forms often include language that explains the possi-
bility that the research sponsor or another party will benefit financially
from the research. 182 A 2008 Canadian study found that research partici-
pants were particularly concerned about their ability to consent if others
176. See Miller, supra note 12, at 561 ("[S]ome individuals whose data are used might
object to the purpose of the research.").
177. See Greely, supra note 12, at 760-61 (providing the examples of research concern-
ing "genetic associations with intelligence, violence, or sexual orientation or research into
human evolution," all of which might be offensive to some individuals); Rothstein, supra
note 14, at 7.
178. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Develop-
ment Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 164, 166 (2003).
179. David Thomas, Release of BIO/Biomedtracker Drug Approval Rates Study, BI-
OTECH NOW (Feb. 15, 2011), www.biotech-now.org/eventsl20ll/021/release-of-biobi-
omedtracker-drug-approval-rates-study/.
180. See PFIZER INC., 2010 FINANCIAL REPORT 25 (2010), available at www.pfizer.com/
files/annualreport/2010/financial/financial20l0.pdf (indicating that, in 2010, Pfizer earned
$10.733 billion from Lipitor, $1.928 billion from Viagra, and $1.718 billion from Effexor).
181. Rothstein, supra note 14, at 7.
182. Id.
[Vol. 65
2012] Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs 109
might gain financial benefits from use of their data.183 If patients are not
asked to consent, they cannot opt out no matter how strongly they object
to this possibility. It should be noted, however, that it is extremely un-
likely that lucrative medical products will be developed entirely based on
observational studies using EHRs. Randomized, controlled clinical trials
remain the gold standard for drug and device approval.184 Thus, manu-
facturers seeking to make large profits will still conduct studies for which
they will need to gain the consent of participants who will in turn have
the opportunity to decline enrollment.
IV. INFORMED CONSENT
Because there is some possibility that record-based research will result
in harm to patients, some would argue that data subjects should be given
an opportunity to withhold consent to release their files for EHR studies.
This Part will address the origins of the informed consent doctrine and
the appropriateness of applying it to EHR database studies. It makes the
case that obtaining informed consent is sensible with respect to clinical
trials that involve human experimentation but is generally unnecessary
for research projects that are restricted to accessing EHR databases. As
we will argue in Part V of the Article, other safeguards that protect data
subjects and are better suited to EHR-based research should replace the
informed consent framework.
A. HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION VS. RECORD-BASED STUDIES
Informed consent undoubtedly has taken root as a normative compo-
nent of medical research. But, examining the origins of the doctrine
reveals that, historically, the underlying concern was largely protecting
subjects against abusive experimental interventions rather than against
unwanted observational studies.
A commitment to informed consent in research emerged from the
ruins of World War II, during which Nazi doctors conducted brutal exper-
iments on prisoners.185 The importance of informed consent was initially
recognized in the Nuremberg Code, the first major international docu-
ment to provide guidelines on research ethics. 186 The Nuremberg Code
opens by stating that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential.' 87 The provision goes on to discuss the need to in-
form each subject of "the nature, duration, and purpose of the experi-
ment" and of "the effects upon his health or person which may possibly
183. Donald J. Willison et al., Alternatives to Project-Specific Consent for Access to Per-
sonal Information for Health Research: Insights from a Public Dialogue, 9 BMC MED.
ETHics 18, 27 (2008).
184. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 2, at 118; Port, supra note 87, at S-5.
185. Sharona Hoffman, supra note 87, at 471.
186. Id.
187. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NUREMBERG CODE 1 (1949), available at http://
ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html.
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come from his participation in the experiment." 188 The studies contem-
plated by the Nuremberg Code, therefore, involve physical interventions
that affect the body, such as the testing perpetrated by the Nazis, rather
than the database queries at issue in this Article.189
A second international document that embodies research ethics gui-
dance, the Declaration of Helsinki, was adopted in 1964 and has been
revised multiple times since. 190 Several provisions of the Declaration de-
tail informed consent requirements, 19' though the consent mandate ap-
plies only to personally identifiable medical data or biological material. 192
Furthermore, the Declaration of Helsinki recognizes that "[t]here may be
situations where consent would be impossible or impractical to obtain for
such research or would pose a threat to the validity of the research. In
such situations the research may be done only after consideration and
approval of a research ethics committee."1 93 Under the Declaration of
Helsinki, research utilizing de-identified data would not require consent,
and further exceptions could be made for use of individually identifiable
data in appropriate circumstances.194
In the United States, the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued the Bel-
mont Report in 1979.195 This project was undertaken in the wake of the
infamous Tuskegee syphilis trial. The trial took place from 1932 until
1972 and involved 600 African-American men, 399 of whom had
syphilis.196 In the course of the study, researchers withheld penicillin
from the subjects after it was proven to be effective in treating syphilis
because they wanted to learn about the natural course of the disease.197
The Belmont Report identified "respect for persons" as one of three foun-
dational principles for ethical research and demands that investigators
obtain informed and voluntary consent from all human subjects.' 98 Spe-
cifically, the Belmont Report states: "Respect for persons requires that
subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the opportunity to
choose what shall or shall not happen to them."'199 This wording and the
historical backdrop of the Belmont Report suggest that its primary con-
cern is clinical experimentation rather than the collection of data from
188. Id.
189. See id. 2 (providing for human consent in an "experiment," not data collection).
190. Hoffman, supra note 87, at 474.
191. WORLD MED. ASS'N DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MED.
RES. INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS §§ 24-29, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publi-
cations/1Opolicies/b3/17c.pdf, [hereinafter DECLARATION OF HELSINKI] (amended 2008).
192. Id. § 25.
193. Id.
194. See id. § 1.
195. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 10; Hoffman, supra note 87, at 472-73.
196. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
SYPHILIS STUDY AT TUSKEGEE (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/
timeline.htm.
197. Id.
198. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 10, at Parts B.1, C.1.
199. Id. at C.1.
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existing records for observational studies.20°
B. THE ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CONTROL MEDICAL RECORDS
Federal regulations that allow record-based research without consent
would likely not violate any constitutional rights.20 1 The Supreme Court
has not found that patients have either a property right or a privacy right
associated with their medical records.
20 2
The question of health data ownership is complicated and lacks a clear
answer. Medical records are generally considered to be the property of
the physicians and hospitals that create them rather than the property of
patients. 203 Several state statutes and judicial decisions acknowledge that
healthcare providers own their records.20 4 However, the property status
of a patient's health data, as opposed to any physical or electronic records
containing such data, is far more ambiguous.
20 5
Recently, several scholars have posited that patients should not enjoy
an absolute ownership right to their health information. For example,
Professor Marc Rodwin argued against "treating patient data as private
property [because it] precludes forming comprehensive databases re-
quired for many of . . .[the] most important public health and safety
uses." 206 He proposed that clinicians, hospitals, and insurers be required
by federal law to report de-identified patient data to public authorities
who would create aggregate databases that researchers could utilize.
20 7
Rodwin believes that patient data should be treated as public property
rather than private property. 20 8 Similarly, Professor Barbara Evans calls
200. The second principle articulated in the Belmont Report is beneficence, which en-
compasses the mandates to "do no harm" and to "maximize potential benefits" while mini-
mizing risks in research. Id. at B.2. The third principle is justice, which requires that the
benefits and risks of research be distributed fairly and that selection procedures for human
subjects be sound and impartial. Id. at B.3. See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing fur-
ther the concepts of beneficence and justice).
201. Rodwin, supra note 41, at 609.
202. See Evans, supra note 107, at 72-73 (noting ownership is left to state law and state
courts have issued inconsistent holdings); see also Rodwin, supra note 41, at 588-89.
203. See Rodwin, supra note 41, at 587-88; Marc A. Rodwin, The Case for Public Own-
ership of Patient Data, 302 JAMA 86, 87 (2009); see also Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy,
and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 642
(2010).
204. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057(1) (West 2007); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-9-65 (West
2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-115-20 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-304(a)(1) (2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03A (West 2011); Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1236 (7th
Cir. 1996); Holtkamp Trucking Co. v. Fletcher, 932 N.E.2d 34, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
Estate of Finkle, 395 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344, 552 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1977). But see Person v. Farm-
ers Ins. Grp. of Cos., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30, 31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that health
records belong to the patient).
205. Hall, supra note 203, at 642; Rodwin, supra note 41, at 588; Evans, supra note 107,
at 72-74. But see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (LexisNexis 2005) ("Medical information
contained in the medical records at any facility licensed under this chapter shall be deemed
to be the property of the patient.").
206. Rodwin, supra note 41, at 589.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 590.
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for a debate about "appropriate public uses of private data and how best
to facilitate these uses while adequately protecting individuals'
interests."20 9
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional
right to informational privacy.210 In a 2011 case, NASA v. Nelson, the
Supreme Court noted that the lower courts have issued inconsistent rul-
ings concerning this purported right.211 The Court explicitly declined to
determine whether a right to informational privacy exists 212 and deter-
mined that if it did, the government's inquiries during employment back-
ground checks would not violate that right.2 13
C. PATIENTS' PREFERENCES REGARDING CONSENT
According to the IOM, public opinion polls show that "a significant
portion of the public would prefer to control all access to their medical
records via informed consent. '2 14 At the same time, empirical data sug-
gests that a majority of Americans are supportive of medical research and
recognize its benefits.215
Several empirical studies sought to determine patient preferences as to
whether they should be asked to consent to research studies that will in-
volve only an examination of their medical files.2 16 Although the results
are inconclusive, a review of a few of them can be illuminating.
Two studies, one from the United States, and one from Canada, found
that patients prefer to be asked for consent and often do not distinguish
between identifiable and de-identified data for purposes of their re-
sponses.2 17 The U.S. study, conducted through telephone interviews of
1,193 patients, focused on research using samples of genetic material.218
It found that 81% of respondents wanted to know about research if their
samples would be identifiable, and 72% wished to be informed if the sam-
ples would be anonymous.219 Of those wanting to know about research
involving either identifiable or anonymized samples, 57% would require
that their permission be sought, and 43% would be content with notifica-
209. Evans, supra note 107, at 77.
210. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 748 (2011).
211. Id. at 756-57.
212. Id. at 757.
213. Id. at 763-64.
214. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 268.
215. Id. at 119.
216. Id. at 81-86.
217. Sara Chandros Hull et al., Patients' Views on Identifiability of Samples and In-
formed Consent for Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIoETHics 62, 69 (2008) (finding that most
patients surveyed did not differentiate between identifiable and non-identifiable genetic
samples and questioning whether the regulatory distinction is useful); Donald J. Willison et
al., Patient Consent Preferences for Research Uses of Information in Electronic Medical
Records: Interview and Survey Data, 326 BMJ 373, 375 (2003) (noting a "lack of distinction
between identifiable and anonymised information" in the minds of survey participants).
The Canadian study involved 123 patients, seventeen of whom were interviewed, while the
remainder completed surveys. Willison et al., supra at 373-74.
218. Hull et al., supra note 217, at 64.
219. Id. at 65.
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tion alone.2 20
The Canadian study asked 1,230 adults for their reaction to (1) use of
data directly from their medical files, and (2) automated abstraction of
data from their EHRs with assurances that direct identifiers would not be
collected.2 21 With respect to use of data directly from medical records,
60% of respondents felt that their permission should be obtained, though
only half of those wished for project-by-project consent rather than gen-
eral consent. 22 2 Twenty-four percent indicated they would be satisfied
with notification alone, and 12% believed that neither notification nor
permission was needed.223 With respect to automated abstraction, 27%,
as opposed to 12%, were comfortable with use of information without
permission or notification.224 The study concluded that the majority of
patients "wished to maintain some level of control over the use of their
information. '225 It is noteworthy, however, that 68% agreed to some de-
gree with the statement: "Research that could be beneficial to people's
health is more important than protecting people's privacy.
226
By contrast, a British study concluded that a majority of patients were
willing to share their data without being asked for consent when no iden-
tifiers would be disclosed to parties other than their treating physi-
cians.227 This study examined responses from 166 patients who recently
had been discharged from a hospital. 228 The questionnaire clearly stated
that doctors, rather than other parties, would access the data in patient
records and would use it in anonymous form.229 It also specified the pur-
poses for which the information would be used, including clinical audits,
research, training, comparison of treatment outcomes in different hospi-
tals, and publications about diseases in medical journals.230 Only 13% of
patients questioned indicated that they would definitely want to be asked
for permission to use their medical records.2 31 Assurances about ano-
nymity, restriction of access to doctors alone, and the constructive pur-
poses for which the data would be used may account for the high degree
of patient willingness to share information without burdening physicians
with consent requirements.
The disparate results make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions
from studies concerning patient preferences and attitudes. The discrep-
220. Id. at 66.
221. Donald J. Willison et al., Alternatives to Project-Specific Consent for Access to Per-
sonal Information for Health Research: What Is the Opinion of the Canadian Public?, 14 J.
AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS'N 706, 707 (2007).
222. Id. at 708.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 709.
225. Id. at 710.
226. Id. at 708.
227. Bruce Campbell, Extracting Information from Hospital Records: What Patients
Think About Consent, 16 QUALITY & SAFETY HEALTH CARE 404, 407 (2007).
228. Id. at 404
229. Id. at 405.
230. Id. at 405-06.
231. Id. at 406.
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ancies may stem from the phrasing of questions in the different studies232
and from variation between the populations of participants. 233 The stud-
ies also reveal some degree of confusion and ambivalence on the part of
patients.234 However, the studies' outcomes suggest that, with further ed-
ucation about the benefits of comprehensive data collection for research
and about the safeguards implemented to protect privacy, patients may
become increasingly willing to prioritize medical advances (from which
they too can benefit) over concerns about risks in the record-based re-
search context. 235
D. THE TROUBLE WITH CONSENT
While consent requirements promote patient autonomy and may be fa-
vored by patients, they can also interfere with the scientific integrity of
the research enterprise. Consent requirements can result in selection bias
that can actually invalidate research outcomes.236 In addition, contacting
thousands or millions of patients who are included in a database can be a
very expensive and time-consuming undertaking for researchers and
might make it impossible for many studies to proceed. 237
1. Informed Consent Can Lead to Selection Bias
One major difficulty with informed consent is that it leads to selection
bias, which can skew research results. 238 This section argues against rou-
tinely granting data subjects a choice concerning inclusion of their
records in research because of the unacceptable risk of selection bias.
a. Selection Bias vs. Confounding
Selection biases result from procedures used to select subjects and
from other factors that affect study participation. 239 The term "selection
bias" is used to describe subtly different kinds of study biases.240 By one
definition, selection bias occurs when those who decide to consent to par-
ticipate in research constitute a subset of individuals who are not repre-
sentative of the patient population of interest.241 This could happen if a
disproportionate number of people of one ancestry or economic class opt
out of a study. It can likewise happen if individuals with certain behavior
232. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 79 ("[H]ow the questions and responses are
worded and framed can significantly influence the results and their interpretation.").
233. Id. at 70.
234. Id. at 201.
235. See Miller supra note 12, at 565 ("[P]ublic education is important to explain the
rationale for access to medical records for research without consent and the safeguards in
place to protect private information from being misused.").
236. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 201; Miller, supra note 12, at 560.
237. Cate, supra note 12, at 1789-93.
238. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 201; Miller, supra note 12, at 560.
239. KENNETH J. ROTHMAN ET AL., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 136 (3d ed. 2008).
240. Miguel A. Herndn et al., A Structural Approach to Selection Bias, 15 EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 615, 615 (2004).
241. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 209; Miller, supra note 12, at 560.
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traits that might be pertinent to a study-such as diet, smoking habits,
alcohol or drug consumption, and exercise-disproportionately opt out.
If the process of obtaining patients' informed consent to participate in
a research study is subject to this kind of selection bias, then the con-
senting patients will not comprise a representative sample of the popula-
tion targeted for study.242 Consequently, using results from the study
population to estimate measures of interest, such as disease prevalence or
average treatment effect, will tend to yield estimates that differ systemati-
cally from the true values of these measures for the target population.243
That is, the estimates will not generalize from the set of consenters to the
target population.
However, in one type of medical research, known as causal effect stud-
ies, accurately estimating population statistics is often not the primary
concern. 244 These studies typically assess whether a certain treatment has
a beneficial causal effect on patients with a particular condition or
whether a certain exposure has a harmful causal effect on individuals.245
In such a study, use of a representative sample of subjects from a broad
population may actually threaten the study's internal validity, due to vari-
ations in factors other than the treatment or exposure and the outcome
(e.g., genetic abnormalities). 246 Thus, researchers may seek a group of
study subjects that is relatively homogeneous, except that some are
treated or exposed and others are not.247 Once the nature and magnitude
of a causal effect is established using such a group, researchers may seek
to generalize the results to a more diverse population either by reasoning
from existing knowledge and theory or by conducting an empirical study
with a sample of subjects that is representative of the population. 248 For
example, although the causal link between smoking and lung cancer was
established mainly through studies of men, the link was assumed by ex-
perts to exist in women also, based on the physiological similarity be-
tween the lungs of women and men.2 49
In causal effect studies, researchers may consider confounding bias
(confounding) to be a greater threat than selection bias to the validity of
causal effect estimates.250 "Classical" confounding occurs when the val-
ues of certain variables, called confounders, influence both whether indi-
viduals receive a treatment or exposure under study and whether they
exhibit the outcomes of interest.251 For example, doctors' concerns about
242. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 209; Miller, supra note 12, at 560.
243. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 209-11.
244. Miguel A. Herndn, A Definition of Causal Effect for Epidemiological Research, 58
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 265, 265 (2004).
245. Id.
246. ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 146-47.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 147.
250. Sander Greenland, Quantifying Biases in Casual Models: Classical Confounding vs
Collider-Stratification Bias, 14 EPIDEMIOLOGY 300, 306 (2003).
251. See id.
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side effects of a new treatment may influence them to favor it for
younger, more robust patients who are likely to have better outcomes
than older, more frail patients.252 Such a practice would result in con-
founding because it would make the new treatment appear far more ef-
fective on average than it really is.253 Elderly, feeble patients who may
not do well with any therapy, including the one at issue, are unlikely to
receive the treatment in question.254 If they did take the study drug and
their poor outcomes were to be considered, the study drug would likely
appear less successful. 255
In an observational study, if all potential confounding variables are
known and are accurately measured, adjustments can be made during sta-
tistical analysis of the results that reduce or eliminate confounding
bias.256 Randomized treatment assignment, when feasible, tends to pre-
vent confounding because randomization helps to ensure that the subjects
in the treatment and control groups are similar with respect to the values
of potential confounding variables, even unknown ones.257 On the other
hand, lack of generalizability to actual patient populations is a recognized
limitation of many randomized trials, which EHR-based observational re-
search is meant to address. 258 Moreover, noncompliance and loss to fol-
low-up may cause substantial confounding and selection bias even in
randomized trials.259
Informed consent itself cannot be a confounding variable in a causal
effect study260 because only patients who consent to participate will be
included in the study. That is, consent status is fixed and not a variable at
all among the participants. Therefore, one might think that seeking in-
formed consent from subjects and allowing them to decline to participate
is not problematic for causal effect studies. However, while informed
consent will not cause confounding, it can still produce a type of selection
bias that makes it difficult to determine whether a certain treatment or
exposure has a causal effect on patients.261
The selection bias at issue, also called "collider bias,"262 is one that
involves selection based on a common causal effect of two factors. 263
Like confounding, this bias can cause a group of subjects who received a
treatment or exposure to differ from the control group, which did not




256. Id. at 58.
257. Id. at 88-89 (discussing randomization).
258. Stewart et al., supra note 79, at w181. For additional discussion of observational
trials, see supra Part III.
259. ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 202.
260. See supra notes 244-50, 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing causal effect
studies).
261. ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 136.
262. Id. at 185.
263. Id. at 136-37 (distinguishing confounding from selection bias); HernAn, supra note
244, at 267.
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receive it, in ways that seriously distort causal effect estimation.264 As we
will illustrate, this kind of selection bias could arise in an EHR-based
study if patients' decisions about permitting research use of their EHRs
are influenced by two factors, one of which also influences the treatment
or exposure variable later studied and the other of which influences the
outcome variable.
Consider, for example, a retrospective EHR-based cohort study under-
taken to determine if taking a certain heavily advertised diet medication
increases a person's risk of heart attack. Suppose that, among the public,
both the probability of individuals using the medication and the
probability of them consenting to research uses of their EHRs increase
with television viewing, due to advertising and other favorable publicity.
Suppose also that chronic stress, though it is not considered in the study,
increases individuals' risk of heart attack but decreases the likelihood
that they will consent to research uses of their EHRs. Assume that, for
these reasons, use of the diet medication among the public is positively
correlated with television viewing and with consent, but it is negatively
correlated with chronic stress. Thus, non-use of the medication is nega-
tively correlated with television viewing and with consent, but it is posi-
tively correlated with chronic stress. Note that these are statistical
associations, not causal relationships; neither using the diet medication
nor avoiding it should be assumed to cause or prevent television viewing,
consent, or chronic stress. Finally, assume there is no one factor that is a
common cause of both using, or not using, the diet medication and of
having, or not having, a heart attack. The causal influences in this hypo-
thetical scenario are illustrated by the causal diagram in Figure 1.
All subjects in the study cohort must have consented to use of their
EHRs in research. Due to the aforementioned correlations, consenters
who took the diet medication were more likely to suffer chronic stress
than consenters who did not take the medication. The two causes of con-
sent are television viewing and absence of chronic stress. Consenters who
did not take the medication were less likely to watch television and hence
more likely to be free of chronic stress. Assume that the diet medication
does not increase the risk of heart attacks. The investigators may errone-
ously come to the opposite conclusion when they compare the outcomes
of the subjects who used the medication to the outcomes of the subjects
who did not use it, because, unknown to the researchers, the users suf-
fered more heart attacks due to chronic stress.
Observe that in this hypothetical scenario consent status is causally in-
fluenced (positively) by television viewing, which is also a cause of using
the diet medication, and is causally influenced (negatively) by chronic
stress, which is also a cause of heart attacks. This led to selection bias
that falsely indicated that the medication caused heart attacks. This hy-
pothetical scenario illustrates how subject selection influenced by in-
264. ROTHMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 186.
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Use 0. Attack
Figure 1: Diagram indicating causal influences among variables in example scenario
illustrating selection bias due to informed consent. Plus sign indicates positive influ-
ence; minus sign indicates negative influence.
formed consent can distort a causal effect estimate because of collider
bias.
b. Selection Bias Is Confirmed by Empirical Evidence
Several studies confirm that selection bias is not merely a theoretical
problem. For instance, one study focused on the Registry of the Cana-
dian Stroke Network, which includes twenty Canadian hospitals. 265
Nurse coordinators obtained consent from approximately 3,100 patients,
and the reasons for non-consent were most often inability to contact the
patient rather than explicit refusal. 266 The authors found major selection
biases because of the consent requirement. Specifically, "the in-hospital
mortality rate among the enrolled patients was only 6.9%, which is much
lower than the true mortality rate among all patients with stroke in Ca-
nada. ''267 This skewing occurred because nurse coordinators had diffi-
culty obtaining consent from grieving or very distressed families of
patients who had died or were critically ill.268 In addition, many patients
could not provide consent because of impairments resulting from their
strokes, and no surrogates were available.2 69 Thus, usually, only the
healthiest patients with the best prognosis provided consent.
In a different research project, 876 Irish patients with ischaemic heart
disease returned questionnaires that included a request for consent to
265. Jack Tu et al., Impracticability of Informed Consent in the Registry of the Canadian
Stroke Network, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1414, 1415 (2004).
266. Id. at 1416-17.
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participate in further research.270 Of these, 574, or 65.5%, signed the
consent form and agreed to participate in the future. 271 Analysis of these
patients' records revealed that their willingness to be involved in further
research correlated with four distinctive predictors: (1) a prior surgical
cardiac intervention, (2) lower blood pressure measurements, (3) lower
cholesterol levels, and (4) being an ex-smoker. 272 The investigators found
clear indications of selection bias and concluded that if consent is re-
quired, study populations may consist disproportionately of individuals
"who have made healthy lifestyle decisions, who have previously bene-
fited from healthcare or those whose clinical risk factors are already well
managed." 273
A review of literature about selection bias, however, concluded that no
clear factors, such as age, sex, socio-economic status, or medical history,
emerged as consistently predictive of which patients would agree or de-
cline to participate in studies.274 Therefore, future studies cannot easily
control for specific factors to combat the problem of selection bias.
An IOM Report, Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy,
Improving Health Through Research, discusses several additional studies
of selection bias.275 The IOM concluded that the HIPAA Privacy Rule's
requirement of patient authorization for use of identifiable health infor-
mation generates biased study samples and jeopardizes the validity of re-
search outcomes.276
2. Obtaining Informed Consent Can Be Costly and Burdensome
In addition to generating selection bias, consent requirements can be
very expensive and work-intensive for investigators. Therefore, they can
significantly hinder research projects or even make them impossible to
pursue.
a. Consent Options
Consent for research drawing upon EHR databases could be sought in
a variety of ways. Each mechanism, however, has its own shortcomings
and risks.
First, data subjects could be asked to consent generally to use of their
records in observational studies. Thus, subjects would be asked to pro-
270. Brian Buckley et al., Selection Bias Resulting from the Requirement for Prior Con-
sent in Observational Research: A Community Cohort of People with Ischaemic Heart Dis-
ease, 93 HEART 1116, 1117-18 (2007).
271. Id. at 1118.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1119.
274. Michelle Kho et al., Written Informed Consent and Selection Bias in Observational
Studies Using Medical Records: Systematic Review, 338 BMJ b866, b873 (2009) (reviewing
seventeen published studies and finding "authorisation bias in studies requiring informed
consent for use of data from medical records").
275. 10M REPORT, supra note 9, at 209-12.
276. Id. at 216.
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vide broad consent for all future, unspecified studies.277 This would be
the least burdensome option for investigators but could nevertheless in-
troduce significant selection bias.278 For example, research concerning
psychiatric conditions or HIV might be obstructed because individuals
with these conditions are particularly worried about privacy leaks and po-
tential stigmatization, and, thus, disproportionately refuse to allow their
records to be included in databases. In addition, because the nature of
future research projects is unknown, it is arguable that subjects who are
asked for consent on a one-time basis cannot realistically make an in-
formed, meaningful choice.279
In the alternative, to maximize data subject autonomy, investigators
could obtain consent for each separate research project from all data sub-
jects.280 Such a requirement, however, would be unworkable. The
databases of de-identified EHRs or federated systems that we envision
would include millions of records. 281 If investigators had to re-contact
every data subject for permission before conducting each study, many re-
search projects could be too costly or time-consuming to pursue.2 82 Re-
search staff might spend more time seeking permission from patients than
actually conducting research to improve health outcomes.
To save time and money, investigators might consider automating con-
sent so that subjects would receive electronic messages about proposed
studies and would be asked to respond electronically to indicate their
agreement or refusal to have their records included. The response rate to
e-mail solicitations, however, is likely to be unsatisfactory, and many may
feel that such an impersonal approach deprives patients of the opportu-
nity to provide truly meaningful consent. 283 Numerous commentators ar-
gue that even more formal and extensive informed consent procedures
are deeply flawed and that subjects often make decisions about participa-
tion without sufficient information or comprehension of the data they are
given.284 If research enrollment requests come as one of dozens of e-
mails that individuals receive each day and if patients are not alerted to
the importance of their decision through more personal contact, they may
well default to ignoring such messages or clicking on a box without giving
the matter significant thought.
However, other methods of contacting subjects, such as by mail or tele-
phone, may endanger privacy and exacerbate selection bias. Patients
277. See Kosseim & Brady, supra note 146, at 22-26; Willison et al., supra note 183, at
19.
278. See supra Part IV.D.1.a.
279. E. Vermeulen, A Trial of Consent Procedures for Future Research with Clinically
Derived Biological Samples, 101 BRIT. J. CANCER 1505, 1505 (2009) ("Still others argue
that informing patients about future research with tissue is impossible, even in basic terms,
and that consent cannot be truly 'informed"').
280. Kosseim & Brady, supra note 146, at 20-22; Willison et al., supra note 183, at 19.
281. Kosseim & Brady, supra note 146, at 9 n.11.
282. Id. at 25.
283. Id. at 20, 24.
284. See Hoffman, supra note 87, at 484-87.
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would need to be re-identified each time consent is sought for individual
studies, and their identities would be linked to their records, which would
be included or excluded according to their preferences. 285 Whoever han-
dles the consent communication would therefore be able to scrutinize
identifiable medical data, and the data could be subject to eavesdropping
by hackers or other intruders.2 86 In addition, patients who know the pre-
cise nature of each project for which they are asked to allow use of their
records may selectively deny permission based on their feelings about the
study or how relevant they believe it is to their own health problems.2 7
Moreover, a process by which patients are frequently contacted by inves-
tigators, asked for consent, and reminded of the risks of inclusion, may
make patients needlessly anxious about research participation and en-
courage them to refuse to allow inclusion of their records.2 88
Several middle-ground options exist as well. For example, data sub-
jects might be permitted to describe particular categories of studies from
which they want their data to be excluded, and their choices would be
included in their EHRs.289 To illustrate, they could indicate that they do
not want their data used in studies concerning genetic abnormalities or
psychological illnesses. Combing through all data subjects' records to de-
termine their preferences, however, would be a very work-intensive task
for researchers unless the function could be fully automated. 290 This op-
tion may also create significant selection bias.291 Large numbers of indi-
viduals may decline to participate because they have the condition at
issue and fear being identified, but these are precisely the individuals
whose records might be most valuable. Similarly, individuals may dispro-
portionately withhold their records because of specific political, cultural,
or other beliefs, and their absence from the study population may skew
research results. 292
Alternatively, patients could describe outcomes they wish to avoid by
stating that they wish to be excluded from studies that might promote
abortion or result in commercial profits for pharmaceutical companies. 293
However, it will likely be impossible for researchers to predict which
studies will ultimately lead to particular outcomes that are objectionable
to specific individuals.294 For example, it may be difficult to determine in
advance whether a research project will ultimately lead to a genetic dis-
285. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 252.
286. Id. at 103.
287. Id. at 251-52.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 102; Mark A. Rothstein, Debate of Patient Privacy Control in Electronic
Health Records, BIoET-ics FORUM (Feb. 17, 2011, 10:09 AM), www.thehastingscenter.org/
bioethicsforumlpost.aspx?id=5139.
290. Rothstein, supra note 289.
291. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 209.
292. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing selection bias).
293. See Willison et al., supra note 221, at 707.
294. Id. at 711.
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covery that could cause some women to abort fetuses because of genetic
abnormalities that became detectable.
Yet another approach would be to allow subjects to refuse disclosure of
certain categories of information.295 These might include sensitive infor-
mation such as psychiatric conditions, HIV status, or sexual history. 296
Thus, data subjects would agree to have all but the designated parts of
their records accessible to researchers. 297 But sequestering such data
would surely compromise the integrity of studies in some instances.2 98
Details of medical history, such as HIV status, psychiatric conditions, and
reproductive problems, may well be relevant to the outcomes of various
biomedical studies or to deciding whether a subject's records should be
included in the first place. 299 Without these details, the other data con-
tained in an EHR may at times be essentially meaningless.
Arguably, the least damaging alternative would be presumed consent
with an opt-out opportunity. Records would be available to researchers
as a default unless the data subject specifically requested that her record
be excluded.3°° In addition, opting out could be made difficult so that
only those who are truly committed to having their records excluded pur-
sue it. To illustrate, rather than checking a box, individuals may be re-
quired to write out a request and may be asked to renew their opt-out
indication annually so that they revisit their decisions. Although this ap-
proach is more appealing than those described above, it still raises con-
cerns about data integrity. Supplying an opt-out choice could be quite
burdensome for researchers if data subjects were to be given the option
for each separate study. Even a general opt-out choice that covered all
EHR studies could lead to selection bias.301 When Iceland adopted a
presumed consent and opt-out approach for inclusion of records in the
country's Health Sector Database, at least 7% of the population, or
20,200 individuals, opted out.30 2 In the United States, if CER is enthusi-
astically promoted by government authorities,30 3 it is possible that politi-
cal opponents, media personalities with political agendas, and others who
are suspicious of government initiatives will encourage large numbers of
followers to opt out, thus diminishing the quality of research databases.
295. Rothstein, supra note 289.
296. Id.; see also Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confi-
dentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 702 (2007). These articles
discuss the option of allowing patients to sequester data in their EHRs in the clinical set-
ting so that it will be hidden from other clinicians; the papers do not address research
questions specifically. See generally Terry & Francis, supra; Rothstein, supra note 289.
297. Terry & Francis, supra note 296, at 702; Rothstein, supra note 289.
298. See Rothstein, supra note 289.
299. Id.
300. Willison et al., supra note 183, at 19.
301. Id. at 23.
302. Jamaica Potts, At Least Give the Natives Glass Beads: An Examination of the Bar-
gain Made Between Iceland and DeCODE Genetics with Implications for Global Biopros-
pecting, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 51-52 (2002); David E.Winickoff, Genome and Nation:
Iceland's Health Sector Database and Its Legacy, 1 INNOVATION 80, 90 (2006).
303. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the Obama Administration's
support for CER).
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b. Empirical Evidence Concerning the Cost of Consent Mandates
Empirical data supports the contention that consent requirements are
associated with significant costs. A 2007 survey of 1,527 epidemiologists
found that the HIPAA Privacy Rule's authorization requirements had
significantly hindered research.30 4 Respondents expressed frustration
with the cost and delays associated with regulatory compliance. 30 5 Other
studies reveal similar objections and even suggest that some health care
providers are opting out of conducting research altogether. 306
Several studies have attempted to quantify the cost and time demands
of consent processes. The study of the Registry of the Canadian Stroke
Network, discussed above, concluded that nurse coordinators spent a
median of forty minutes with each patient or surrogate for consent pur-
poses, including the time spent arranging interviews. 307 In addition, of
the 2 million Canadian dollars spent on the registry during the first two
years, $500,000 was spent on consent activities alone.30 8 A British study
estimated that the cost of obtaining consent through a combination of e-
mail, mail, and telephone calls for review of records of prostate cancer
patients was $248 for each man who consented.309 In a U.S. study, 2,228
mothers who were likely to deliver preterm infants were approached in
person for consent to a study of neonatal care. Consent was found to
take between 1,735 and 2,790 hours and to cost between $65,945 and
$106,029, depending on staff salaries. 310 Yet another study focused on
parental consent to the participation of 2,496 middle-school-aged children
in a survey. 311 Consent, involving three mailings and follow-up telephone
calls to non-responders, was estimated to cost at least $50,000. 3 12
It is difficult to determine how these figures would translate into a cost
estimate for obtaining consent, on either a one-time basis or a case-by-
case basis, from potential EHR research subjects. It is clear, however,
that an effort to contact and obtain consent from all or most U.S. patients
for purposes of creating and using national databases would be extremely
expensive.
304. Roberta B. Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298
JAMA 2164, 2167 (2007).
305. Id.
306. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 199-209.
307. Tu et al., supra note 265, at 1418.
308. Id.
309. Sian Noble et al., Feasibility and Cost of Obtaining Informed Consent for Essential
Review of Medical Records in Large-Scale Health Services Research, 14 J. HEALTH SER-
VICES RES. & POL'Y 77, 79-80 (2009). Of the 230 individuals who were sent consent forms,
179 consented. Id.
310. Wade D. Rich et al., Antenatal Consent in the SUPPORT Trial: Challenges, Costs,
and Representative Enrollment, 126 PEDIATRICS e215, e217-18 (2010).
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sent, 23 EVALUATION REV. 316, 320, 322, & 329 (1999).
312. Id.
SMU LAW REVIEW
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the words of the IOM, "[t]he principle of autonomy currently domi-
nates the ethical landscape for both medical care and clinical research in
the United States. '313 The current, consent-centered ethical framework
is based on the assumption that research will involve human experimen-
tation, and is firmly rooted in a history of shocking research abuses. 314
As recently as 2011, Wellesley College Professor Susan Reverby discov-
ered evidence of previously unknown human subject exploitation.315
From 1946 to 1948, American researchers deliberately infected Guatema-
lan prison inmates, mental patients, and soldiers with venereal diseases to
test the efficacy of penicillin.316 All instances of serious research abuse,
however, have occurred in the context of interventional studies. 317 With
respect to record-based research, and in light of the great promise of
EHR research databases, it is appropriate to shift the discussion from
autonomy to a new focus on the goal of promoting the common good.
We wish to emphasize that we address only research that involves re-
cord review without clinical testing. One might be concerned that focus-
ing on the common good will lead to a slippery slope and, eventually, to
rationalizing away informed consent altogether. In the research context,
however, it is easy to draw a bright-line distinction between interven-
tional and record-based studies. In the case of interventional studies,
concerns about harm to human subjects should not be subordinated to
the goal of promoting social benefits, and consent should not be aban-
doned. The same is not true, however, for noninterventional research so
long as all studies are subject to stringent oversight and privacy
protections.318
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMON GOOD
The traditional concepts of informed consent center upon the individ-
ual rights of research subjects because the research contemplated is gen-
erally physically or psychologically invasive. With the advent of large
EHR databases and the proliferation of research studies that involve only
record review, it is appropriate to turn to the value of the common good
as a counterweight to concern about individual risk. When human beings
are not subject to any physical or psychological testing in research, and
only their records are scrutinized, the value of the common good should
prevail over individual interests. Society's interests in achieving medical
advances should outweigh the individual risks of privacy breaches and
313. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 247.
314. See supra Parts Ill.A, IV.A.
315. Donald G. McNeil Jr., U.S. Infected Guatemalans with Syphilis in '40s, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2010, at Al.
316. Id.
317. See David J. Rothman, Ethics and Human Experimentation: Henry Beecher Revis-
ited, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1195, 1195-96 (1987).
318. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
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non-privacy-related dignitary injuries31 9 when all reasonable efforts are
made to prevent such harms.
All patients benefit from medical care improvements that have been
made possible by past research studies. Thus, it is arguably irresponsible
or inequitable for some patients to prohibit researchers from accessing
their data and decline to make their own contribution to the research
endeavor.320 Refusal to participate in research can be characterized as
"free riding" because there is no practical way to prevent those who do
not contribute their records to research from enjoying the benefits of im-
proved treatment resulting from biomedical studies.
32 1
Subordinating individual freedom to the common good because indi-
viduals profit from societal initiatives is consistent with the philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of social consent. Rousseau spoke of a
social contract by which individuals willingly give up freedom and auton-
omy to enjoy the advantages of living in society.322 Individuals who are
residents of a political state necessarily accept its benefits, and by doing
so, citizens tacitly consent to the laws that enable governmental authority
to function. 323 The concept of social consent may be applied to the medi-
cal arena as well. Because essentially all individuals will at some time in
their lives receive medical care, they may be deemed to tacitly consent to
having their EHRs available for research that makes treatment possible.
A few bioethicists have gone as far as to argue that individuals have a
moral duty to participate in biomedical research, which extends even to
interventional studies.324 However, one need not take a position regard-
ing whether participation in research rises to the level of a moral duty to
argue that it is ethically sound to prohibit patients from withholding their
information from EHR databases.
B. THE COMMON GOOD AS EMBODIED IN BENEFICENCE AND JUSTICE
The value of the common good has already been incorporated into bi-
omedical ethics through the second and third concepts articulated in the
319. See supra Part III.B.
320. Miller, supra note 12, at 564.
321. Id.; see also Sarah Chan & John Harris, Free Riders and Pious Sons-Why Science
Research Remains Obligatory, 23 BIOETHICS 161, 162-64 (2009); G. Owen Schaefer et al.,
The Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, 302 JAMA 67, 68 (2009).
322. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 52-53 (Roger D. Masters
ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978).
323. Id.; Edward A. Harris, Note, From Social Contract to Hypothetical Agreement:
Consent and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 676 (1992).
324. See, e.g., John Harris, Scientific Research Is a Moral Duty, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 242,
247 (2005); Rosamond Rhodes, In Defense of the Duty to Participate in Biomedical Re-
search, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37, 38 (2008); Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics,
5 Am. J. BIOETHICs 7, 15 (2005) ("reasonable people should endorse policies that make
research participation a social duty"); Schaefer et al., supra note 321, at 67. But see Stuart
Rennie, Viewing Research Participation as a Moral Obligation: In Whose Interests?, 41
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 40, 46 (2011) (arguing that the moral status of research participa-
tion should not be changed).
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Belmont Report.32 5 Thus, it is not foreign to the field of research ethics.
Beneficence mandates that researchers do no harm and maximize po-
tential benefits while minimizing research risks.326 Beneficence most
clearly dictates that investigators eschew harming individual research par-
ticipants.327 However, the Belmont Report also recognizes the impor-
tance of societal interests and instructs that the benefits "that may result
from the improvement of knowledge and from the development of novel
medical, psychotherapeutic, and social procedures" must be considered in
determining whether to proceed with research studies.328 The Belmont
Report's explanation of the principle's application states that at times the
potential to gain significant societal benefits from research will justify
risks to individual human subjects and that the loss of such potential ben-
efits is of serious concern. 329
The principle of justice requires that the benefits and risks of research
be distributed fairly and that selection procedures for human subjects be
sound and impartial. 330 This principle prohibits exploitation of vulnera-
ble groups for the benefit of those who are more advantaged.331 The
vulnerable must not bear a disproportionate burden in research initia-
tives, and those who will benefit must make a fair contribution. 332 EHR-
based research is likely to encompass many, if not most medical condi-
tions, and it is impossible to predict in advance what knowledge it will
yield over the years and who will benefit from it. Consequently, the prin-
ciple of justice supports inclusion of all Americans in EHR databases to
promote the common good.
C. THE COMMON GOOD As APPLIED TO THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The common good principle supports the imposition of certain burdens
on patients, namely, depriving them of choice as to whether their EHRs
are accessible to researchers. At the same time, the common good re-
quires concessions from health care providers who create EHRs, includ-
ing physicians, clinics, hospitals, and others. Despite having ownership
claims to medical files,333 health care entities must make their records
available to researchers to facilitate treatment improvements.334 In addi-
tion, providers should not be able to charge excessive fees for access to
the records they control. As discussed above, to be useful, a research
325. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text for prior discussion of the Belmont
Report.
326. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 10, at B.2.
327. See id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at C.2.
330. Id. at B.3.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
334. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 230 (stating that researchers report that they
"have difficulty obtaining deidentified information" from health care entities).
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database must be sufficiently large and contain records that are represen-
tative of all segments of the patient population so that it generates relia-
ble and generalizable research outcomes. 335 Providers, like patients, will
benefit from medical advances because they will enjoy professional suc-
cess, enhanced reputations, career satisfaction, and perhaps larger in-
comes resulting from improved knowledge and more effective treatment
protocols. It would be entirely unfair to deprive patients of the right to
control their health information and the opportunity to consent to their
research use but leave providers at liberty to refuse to contribute their
files. Achieving social benefits will thus require cooperation and conces-
sions on the part of both patients and the health care industry.
D. PUBLIC HEALTH PRECEDENTS
Public policy already places the common good ahead of concerns about
privacy and autonomy in establishing a large number of reporting re-
quirements. Physicians are required by law to report to authorities cases
of particular infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, sexually transmit-
ted diseases, infection by bioterrorism agents, and new epidemic ill-
nesses.33 6 State legislatures have also imposed reporting requirements
with respect to conditions that affect a patient's ability to drive safely and
injuries resulting from child abuse, elder abuse, or violence against an
intimate partner or dependent adult.337 To comply with these mandates,
physicians must supply personally identifiable information without asking
patients for consent or deferring to patients' privacy concerns.
338
The public health reporting requirements produce information that is
conveyed only to the government and that addresses particular medical
problems.339 The research initiatives contemplated in this Article are dis-
tinguishable in that they would open EHR databases to private sector
researchers and would yield less certain and less predictable public bene-
fits. Nevertheless, the reporting mandates constitute precedent for an ap-
proach that assigns primacy to public welfare over individual privacy and
other dignitary concerns.
VI. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS: PROTECTING DATA SUBJECTS
WHILE PROMOTING RECORD-BASED RESEARCH
Even with greater focus on the principle of promoting the public good,
concerns about the privacy vulnerabilities of EHR-based research and
the risk of harm to data subjects cannot be taken lightly. The opportunity
to consent, however, does not protect data subjects from harm if they
335. See supra Part IV.D.1.
336. John C. Moskop et al., From Hippocrates to HIPAA: Privacy and Confidentiality in
Emergency Medicine-Part I: Conceptual, Moral, and Legal Foundations, 45 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 53, 57 (2005).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2010).
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choose to participate in research studies.340 Consent merely allows indi-
viduals to assume the risks knowingly or to opt out completely.
As noted earlier, the federal research regulations and the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule do not prohibit record-based research in the absence of con-
sent.341 Neither covers de-identified EHRs; limited data sets can be
employed without patient authorization; and even research using clearly
identifiable information can proceed without informed consent if author-
ized by an IRB or privacy board.342 This Article, therefore, does not pro-
pose a radical departure from the current regulatory regime. It argues
only that, as a norm, consent need not be sought for non-interventional
research.
Nevertheless, record-based research without consent will be ethically
justified only if a number of important safeguards are implemented. This
Part first analyzes identity concealment techniques and urges that they be
used as often as possible. Second, it recommends additional oversight
mechanisms that help compensate for the limitations of identity conceal-
ment techniques and are tailored to EHR-based research. Finally, it pro-
poses that notice be provided to all individuals whose records might be
included in research projects (even in de-identified form), and empha-
sizes the need for public education about the nature and benefits of
EHR-based research.
A. IDENTITY CONCEALMENT TECHNIQUES
One mechanism to address concerns about privacy is identity conceal-
ment. A large body of work exists concerning a variety of identity con-
cealment techniques, including k-anonymity, 1-diversity, and others.343 A
comprehensive treatment of the topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
Here, we detail recommendations for only two options: 1) building large
databases of de-identified records to which researchers can have direct
access; and 2) establishing federated systems through which researchers
can conduct statistical analyses of distributed databases and receive sum-
mary information without direct identifiers.
1. Large Databases of De-Identified Data
Patient privacy may be protected through de-identification. All eigh-
teen safe harbor provision identifiers would need to be removed to mini-
340. Peddicord, supra note 5, at 2087.
341. See supra Part lI.B.
342. See supra Part lJ.B.
343. Ashwin Machanavajjhala et al., L-Diversity: Privacy Beyond K-Anonymity, 1
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY FROM DATA 1, 1, 2 (2007); see gener-
ally, CHARU C. AGGARWAL & PHILIP S. Yu, PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MINING: MOD-
ELS AND ALGORITHMS (1st ed. 2008); Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and
Security Myths and Fallacies of "Personally Identifiable Information", 53 COMM. OF THE
ACM 24, 25 (2010); Latanya Sweeney, K-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10
INT'L J. UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557, 557-70 (2002).
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mize the possibility of re-identification. 344 To ensure appropriate de-
identification, information technology experts would de-identify patient
records and copy them to a separate database that would be available to
researchers.
34 5
If it is to yield reliable and widely applicable research results, the
database should be as comprehensive as possible. 346 As we suggested in
previous work, ideally, a national research database would include all
Americans' de-identified EHRs.347 An important question is whether, as
Professor Marc Rodwin recommended, health care providers should be
required by law to submit their EHRs to a research database. 348
A strict legal mandate, while scientifically justifiable, may generate an
outcry from the medical, and perhaps patient communities, fueled by pol-
iticians and news media who wish to generate distrust and resentment of
"big government" initiatives. 349 Such an outcry could hinder compliance
and foster public resentment of the entire biomedical research endeavor.
Consequently, policy makers may consider alternatives to mandated
participation in a comprehensive national research database. A system of
incentives and disincentives would be needed to encourage providers to
contribute their EHRs.350 For example, access to the database should be
available only to investigators whose institutions contribute their records
to it.351 Another incentive may be access to commercial services that
serve as electronic resources for clinicians. 352 For example, we have pro-
posed the development of services for conducting personalized compari-
sons of treatment effectiveness (PCTE).353 For a given patient seeking
the most appropriate treatment for her condition, a PCTE service would
characterize the relative effectiveness of the available treatments by ana-
lyzing EHRs for a cohort of treated patients who, when treated, were
similar to the given patient with respect to clinically relevant factors. 354
The creation of such services would give institutions and individual prov-
iders that do not conduct research a stake in the success of the database,
thereby increasing the likelihood that they will contribute the EHRs
under their control.355 Use of the service could be denied to those who
344. See supra Part III.B.l.b.ii (discussing re-identification risks).
345. See IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 173.
346. See id. at 146-47.
347. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 2, at 162-64.
348. Rodwin, supra note 41, at 615-16 (recommending that federal law mandate the
creation of a national database of de-identified data and require health care providers to
submit their records to the government for this purpose).
349. See id. at 589-90.
350. See id. at 599-600.
351. One complication may be that some research institutions will not have their own
EHR systems.
352. See PRICEWATEHOusECooPERS, supra note 2, at 5.
353. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes Through
Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records,
39 J.L. MED. & ETmics 425, 425 (2011).
354. Id.
355. See PRICEWATERHOuSECOOPERS, supra note 2, at 3.
SMU LAW REVIEW
fail to do so.
The principal drawback of relying on incentives to encourage contribu-
tions to the database rather than establishing an enforceable mandate is
that incentives may not be strong enough to induce full participation, es-
pecially if there are commercial advantages to nonparticipation. 356 There
would be nothing to stop providers from opting out based on their own
cost-benefit calculations. 357
2. Does De-Identification Compromise Data Quality?
To be deemed de-identified under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, records
must have eighteen types of identifiers removed.358 Researchers may be
legitimately concerned that removing so many identifiers will compro-
mise the quality or usefulness of research data. One author asserts that
removal of the eighteen HIPAA identifiers would render data "useless
for most medical research. '359 Another paper concluded that elimination
of the HIPAA data elements reduced data by 31% and precluded access
to information that is vitally important for research purposes. 360 Of par-
ticular importance may be the elimination of all elements of dates other
than year, which could prevent researchers from determining the time
that elapsed between episodes of care.361 Similar objections were voiced
in comments submitted to HHS concerning the proposed HIPAA Privacy
Rule in 2000 and 2002.362
In response, HHS explained that it very carefully researched the data
elements to be included in the HIPAA safe harbor provision 363 and
strove to "balance the need to protect individuals' identities with the
need to allow de-identified databases to be useful. ' 364 The safe harbor
provision allows retention of some information about geographic loca-
tion, including the relevant state and, in most cases, the first three zip
code digits. 365 It also allows disclosure of dates, including age, by year,
356. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 2, at 126-28.
357. See id.
358. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010).
359. Cate, supra note 12, at 1789.
360. Infectious Diseases Soc'y of Am., Grinding to a Halt: The Effects of the Increasing
Regulatory Burden on Research and Quality Improvement Efforts, 49 CLINICAL INFEC-
TIoUs DISEASES 328, 330 (2009).
361. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 175.
362. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,710 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164); Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,232 (Aug. 14, 2002)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164); see also IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 232-33.
363. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 82,710-12; Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 53,232-34.
364. Standard of Privacy of Individual Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at
53,232.
365. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010). The initial three digits of a zip code cannot
be disclosed if 20,000 or fewer people live in that zip code, but, according to HHS, as of
2002, only seventeen zip codes were excluded for this reason. Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,234.
[Vol. 65
2012] Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs 131
though not by more specific units.366 Finally, important details such as
race, sex, religion, and income need not be redacted from records in or-
der to render them de-identified. 367 HIPAA-qualified, de-identified data
should thus be sufficient for some studies.
3. Secure Statistical Analysis of Distributed Databases
Nevertheless, for other studies, it may be crucial to include identifiers
beyond those permitted by the limited data set provision. In these cases,
a possible alternative is a technique known as secure statistical analysis of
distributed databases. 368
Secure statistical analysis of distributed databases involves querying
databases that participate in a federated system, using special algorithms
intended to prevent disclosure of sensitive information.369 In a federated
system, such as the FDA's Sentinel Initiative and DARTNet, 370 each in-
stitution manages and maintains control of its own database, but distrib-
uted queries are possible through a standard web service. 371 Ideally, all
health care providers in the country would participate in a comprehensive
federated system, but smaller federated systems may be created at least
as a first step. Researchers with approved research projects 372 would sub-
mit statistical queries via the Internet using software that interfaces with
the federated system's distributed query service. The query service would
interact with all relevant databases 373 to initiate operations, communicate
intermediate results, and return the final results to researchers. Individ-
ual databases in the federation would cooperate to compute summary
statistics, but they would not share individual records or sensitive statis-
tics that would identify particular organizations. 374 The query service
366. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(C). Ages over 89 must be aggregated into a single
category of 90 or older, presumably because relatively few people reach that age range.
See id.
367. See § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
368. Alan F. Karr et al., Secure Regression on Distributed Databases, 14 J. COMPUTA-
TIONAL & GRAPHICAL STAT. 263, 263-64 (2005).
369. Id.; see also Oren E. Livne et al., Federated Querying Architecture for Clinical and
Translational Health IT, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1ST ACM INTERNATIONAL HEALTH IN-
FORMATICS SYMPOSIUM 250, 251-54 (2010); Wilson D. Pace et al., An Electronic Practice-
Based Network for Observational Comparative Effectiveness Research, 151 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 338, 338-39 (2009).
370. See supra notes 36-37, 46-49 and accompanying text.
371. Griffin M. Weber et al., The Shared Health Research Information Network
(SHRINE): A Prototype Federated Query Tool for Clinical Data Repositiones, J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS'N 624, 624 (2009).
372. See discussion infra Part VI.B.I.b (discussing approval and oversight mechanisms).
373. Queries may be qualified in various ways. For example, a researcher may limit the
query to a particular state or geographic region.
374. Alan F. Karr, Secure Statistical Analysis of Distributed Databases, Emphasizing
What We Don't Know, 1 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 197, 197, 199 (2009). The ap-
proach could support analyses using a number of standard statistical techniques, but it
would not permit investigators to employ whatever techniques they choose. For example,
entities could fit a linear regression model Y = AX + A to their global data, consisting of
values for the predictor variable(s) X and the outcome variable Y, and share the coeffi-
cient(s) A of the fitted model, without disclosing to each other either individual-level or
entity-level data.
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would provide researchers with a somewhat restricted choice of standard
statistical query types, enabling them to compute, for example, estimates
of population or subpopulation means, proportions, and ratios and esti-
mates of regression coefficients. 375 A requirement that users of the statis-
tical query service be authorized researchers would limit access by illicit
users, and improper use of the service by authorized users could be de-
tected after the fact by analyzing logs recording their interactions with the
service. 376
The following are two illustrations to elucidate the use of secure statis-
tical analysis of distributed databases. First, a researcher might submit a
query asking for the prevalence of a particular disease among the popula-
tion represented by the combined records contained in the federated sys-
tem. After statistical analysis, the researcher would receive an estimate
of the proportion of the population diagnosed with that disease. Second,
an investigator could conduct more complex CER 377 using the service.
The investigator would indicate the treatments at issue, the outcome mea-
sures of interest, and any known confounders, and would select the de-
sired analytical approach. Given these parameters, the query service
would conduct the statistical analysis and provide results to the re-
searcher. For example, the query service might select and compare two
treatment groups, each of which received a different treatment, ensuring
that the groups are balanced with respect to values of known confounding
variables. Ultimately, the investigator would receive a numerical esti-
mate of the difference in the average treatment effects for the two
groups.
Statistical databases in general are not invulnerable to attack, and a
number of technical issues must be resolved for secure statistical analysis
of distributed databases to become widely applicable.378 Ideally, the ap-
proach would yield useful research data by allowing original, non-re-
dacted medical records to be queried at their facilities of origin while
protecting patient privacy because investigators would only see informa-
tion summarizing aggregate data. The participating organizations would
each need to support the same data schema, communication protocol,
querying interface, and security policy.
Given the health information technology resources needed to support
the requirements for a participating database within a federated system, it
is likely that small or resource-poor health care providers would have to
use trusted third-party aggregators 379 to provide the query service. These
375. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 2, at 118-19.
376. See id. at 154-55 (discussing audit trails).
377. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing comparative
effectiveness).
378. See Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMMS.
ACM 86, 86-95 (2011); Karr, supra note 374, at 202-95.
379. See David Kitte, Report of the Data Sharing and Aggregation Workshop, AGENCY
FOR HIEALTHCARE REs. & QUALITY, http://ahrq.gov/qual/performance3/perfm3c.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2011).
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providers would need to upload new and updated EHRs regularly to the
aggregator but would not have to support statistical queries themselves.
Other providers may also choose to use trusted aggregators in order to
avoid conflicts of interest among competing health care entities con-
ducting commercially oriented research. If researchers from such entities
had to submit queries directly to competitors, the queries themselves
might reveal the exact nature of the research. Such disclosure might
cause the querying entity to lose its competitive advantage and diminish
potential profits from research discoveries. Trusted aggregators can serve
as intermediaries who hold copies of medical records and process queries
from researchers without revealing them to other parties. For this reason,
the aggregators should be government contractors subject to rigorous
oversight. Given that there is a risk of disclosures from any database, the
maximum number of EHRs under the control of any one aggregator
should be limited.
B. STRENGTHENING RESEARCH OVERSIGHT
Identity concealment is a useful safeguard against research abuses, but
it cannot fully shield data subjects from harm and must be supplemented
by other protections. This Article has argued that informed consent re-
quirements should be suspended for all record-based studies.380 How-
ever, in lieu of having an opportunity to consent, data subjects should
enjoy the benefits of rigorous oversight and feel as confident as possible
about its efficacy. Because of the risk of re-identification, even studies
using de-identified records should undergo an approval procedure,
though it can be streamlined. This section outlines a tiered review pro-
cess that would apply some degree of scrutiny to all research projects. It
also emphasizes the importance of continuing review and offers recom-
mendations for enhanced security measures to protect EHR databases.
1. Ethics Board Review
Regulations that require approval and monitoring of all studies by an
ethics board could go far to protect data subjects from the risks of record-
based research. The IOM developed a relevant proposal, which is de-
scribed and critiqued. We then offer an alternative framework that would
provide data subjects with more comprehensive protections.
a. IOM Proposal
In Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving
Health through Research, the IOM detailed a proposal to remove barriers
to record-based research.381 It recommended that waivers of informed
consent be granted so long as consent is replaced by other protection
380. See supra Part III.
381. IOM REPORT, supra note 9.
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mechanisms. 382 Accordingly, researchers who believe direct identifiers
are necessary for their studies and who do not wish to obtain consent,
would seek approval from an ethics oversight board with expertise in re-
viewing records-based research. 383 The board could grant waivers for
studies using identifiable health information after considering the follow-
ing: (1) measures that will be taken to safeguard data security, (2) possi-
ble harms to which inappropriate disclosure would expose subjects, and
(3) the study's potential benefits.384 The IOM did not recommend ethics
board oversight for studies in which no direct identifiers would be availa-
ble to investigators.385
The IOM proposal has several strengths. The IOM specifies that ethics
boards would need to have special expertise with respect to record-based
research, unlike traditional IRBs that often focus largely on studies in-
volving clinical testing.386 In addition, boards would be specifically di-
rected to scrutinize the privacy safeguards that investigators plan to
implement. 387
However, the IOM's proposal does not go far enough. First, it does not
define the term "direct identifiers" and, thus, does not clarify which data
elements would trigger ethics board review. 388 Second, the IOM does not
support subjecting studies that do not involve "direct identifiers" to any
oversight.389 Third, the IOM relies excessively on pre-approval of re-
search protocols. 390 The ethics board is envisioned as scrutinizing only
security measures that researchers plan to implement without following
up to ensure that they have been employed and are effective. 391 The
IOM recommendations do not take into account the multiplication of risk
that occurs when de-identified health information is promulgated to more
and more research groups, each of which is a point of potential vulnera-
bility to security and privacy violations.392 The IOM recommendations
also do not take into account the highly changeable nature of security
threats.
b. Proposed Regulatory Approach
As detailed above, data de-identification and identity concealment in
general do not entirely eliminate the risk of privacy violations. With
some effort, adversaries could re-identify at least a small percentage of
records, and this risk cannot be ignored. 393








390. Id. at 264.
391. Id. at 265.
392. Id.
393. See supra Part III.B.l.b.ii.
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Consequently, this Article proposes that all record-based studies un-
dergo approval by an ethics board with expertise in non-interventional
research and in information security. This task could be assigned to ex-
isting IRBs, but because these bodies are already overworked and may
not have the requisite expertise, 394 separate reviewing entities could be
established exclusively for record-based studies. We use the term "ethics
boards" in this section but do not mean to suggest that these must neces-
sarily be different from IRBs.
The degree of scrutiny that ethics boards apply to studies should de-
pend on the extent to which researchers or others may be able to identify
patient data and on the severity of the potential harm. Studies using any
identifiers that are excluded by the HIPAA safe harbor provision, includ-
ing limited data sets, 395 should undergo a thorough approval process.
Limited data sets should be subject to careful scrutiny because they can
include birthdates and zip codes, which significantly increase the possibil-
ity of re-identification. 396 The ethics board should pay particular atten-
tion to the security measures that will be implemented. It should also
verify the credentials of applicants to ensure that they are bona fide re-
searchers who have a genuine research project in mind.
If, for some reason, researchers must obtain directly identifiable data
such as names or social security numbers, ethics boards should remain
free, at their discretion, to require patient consent. For example, in-
formed consent may be appropriate for a small study that allows investi-
gators to obtain patient names and view sensitive medical information
including psychiatric or gynecological records.
Studies in which researchers will view only data that are de-identified
in accordance with the HIPAA safe harbor provision should undergo a
streamlined process through which investigators register their projects
and their identities are confirmed. The researchers should also promise
in writing that they will not attempt to re-identify data, will not convey
the records they obtain to individuals who are not members of the re-
search team, and will refrain from using data for purposes outside the
scope of the study. In addition, researchers should commit to disposing
of any records they have obtained in identifiable or de-identified form,
394. Joseph A. Catania et al., Survey of U.S. Boards That Review Mental Health-Related
Research, 3 J. EMPIR. RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 71, 71 (2009) (noting concern about IRB
workloads); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research: Identify-
ing Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 282, 284 (2004)
("IRBs may review research for which they lack expertise and rely on information given by
investigators without corroboration"); David A. Hyman, Institutional Review Boards: Is
This the Least Worst We Can Do?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 750, 761 (2007) (discussing IRBs'
heavy workload).
395. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
396. One study found that for limited data sets, the risk of re-identification ranges from
10% to 60%, depending on the information that different states make publicly available.
See Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 169. Currently, the Common Rule does not make
clear whether research using limited data sets would require IRB approval and consent,
and the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires data use agreements but no patient authorization
for such studies. See supra notes 60-61, 78 and accompanying text.
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using approved means, at the end of a designated period.397
Furthermore, it would be essential for ethics boards to conduct contin-
uing reviews of all research studies.398 Researchers should be required to
submit annual reports and to inform the board immediately of any ad-
verse events, such as hacking or inappropriate disclosure of data to third
parties. If data are not appropriately safeguarded, ethics boards may not
approve future studies by the same investigators, may require corrective
action, or may withdraw approval of the study and mandate that it be
stopped.399 Monitoring by the boards should be supplemented with over-
sight by HHS, which is charged with HIPAA Security Rule enforce-
ment.400 HHS should be authorized to conduct unannounced audits of all
research projects, including those using de-identified data, to ensure that
investigators are safeguarding privacy with appropriate security measures
and are engaging in valid research activities rather than misusing data.40 1
HHS should also ensure that the ethics boards are responsibly fulfilling
their duties.
Ethics board oversight for all record-based studies is a novel recom-
mendation that departs from the IOM's more modest proposal and pro-
posals made by other analysts. Professor Rodwin has suggested that after
records are fully de-identified, they be made available to the public, per-
haps for a fee.40 2 We believe it would be irresponsible to allow any mem-
ber of the public to access de-identified EHRs without any oversight
because, over time, such a policy would likely lead to abuses.
If a large number of de-identified EHRs were to be publicly available,
data miners would gain many targets for re-identification, and they could
expend as much time and computational power as they have available.
Even with a low success rate, they may be able to re-identify a large num-
ber of EHRs.403 For example, if data miners had access to a database of
de-identified EHRs for every person in the United States (over 311 mil-
lion people) 40 4 and they de-identified records with a 0.10% success
rate,405 they would be able to de-identify EHRs of over 311,000 people.
Moreover, some data miners, such as certain commercial enterprises, may
397. See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1767.
398. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (2010) (discussing continuing review by IRBs); Hoffman, supra
note 17, at 738-43.
399. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (2010) (empowering IRBs to suspend or terminate studies
that they approved).
400. Id. § 160.308.
401. The HIPAA Security Rule already authorizes HHS to engage in enforcement ac-
tivities, including conducting compliance reviews; this authority should be expanded to all
research activities, including those involving databases of de-identified records. See id.; see
also discussion infra Part VI.B.1.c (discussing security safeguards).
402. Rodwin, supra note 41, at 615.
403. See PETER WINKELSTEIN, MEDICAL INFORMATICS KNOWLEDGE AND DATA MIN-
ING IN BIOMEDICINE 153-54 (HsinChin Chen et al. eds., 2005).
404. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. & World Population Clocks, CENSUS.GOV, http://
www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
405. Benitez & Malin, supra note 153, at 169 (finding that between 0.01% and 0.25% of
a state's population is vulnerable to re-identification if data is de-identified in accordance
with the HIPAA safe harbor provision).
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have access to external data, gleaned from various sources, that greatly
facilitates re-identification.4°6
Regulators should also consider whether research proposals should be
subject to further limitations. For example, should ethics boards limit the
number of records to which investigators have access? 40 7 Should an up-
per limit be set for the number of queries a research team submits to a
statistical database on the theory that an unreasonable number of queries
might indicate that the data are being used for inappropriate purposes?
These questions require further study by security experts who would need
to balance the needs of researchers against the need to optimize privacy
protection.
Ethics board review and supervision of all record-based projects will
surely entail costs, though the streamlined approach for de-identified
records is designed to curb expenses. To finance ethics board operations,
federal regulations could require applicants who seek project approval to
pay a fee to HHS. A precedent for such an approach is set by the Pre-
scription Drug User Fee Act 40 8 and the Medical Device User Fee and
Modernization Act of 2002,409 which require drug and device manufac-
turers seeking FDA approval to pay certain fees.
c. Security Safeguards
As emphasized throughout this Article, a major concern relating to re-
cord-based research is the risk of privacy breaches. HHS addressed se-
curity concerns relating to electronically stored health information by
promulgating the HIPAA Security Rule in 2005.410 These regulations re-
quire implementation of a variety of administrative, physical, and techni-
cal safeguards. 411 The Security Rule, however, applies only to health
plans, health care clearinghouses, health care providers who transmit
health information in electronic form for particular purposes, and their
business associates. 412 Other entities are not required to employ any of
the Rule's security measures no matter how much health data they may
store or process.4 13
We have suggested improvements to the HIPAA Security Rule in prior
work.414 A critical modification would be expanding the definition of
"covered entities" to ensure that all researchers, as well as entities or in-
dividuals who operate research databases, are subject to regulatory re-
quirements. The term "covered entity" should apply to "any person who
406. MEHMED KANTARDZIC, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS, MODELS, AND ALGORITHMS
380 (2d ed. 2011):
407. See Ohm, supra note 69, at 1767.
408. 21 U.S.C. § 379h (Supp. IV 2010) (detailing fees that must be paid by those sub-
mitting human drug applications).
409. Id. § 379j(a).
410. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (2010).
411. Id.
412. Id. § 160.103; 42 U.S.C. § 17931 (2006).
413. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 127, at 344-45.
414. Id. at 359-84.
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knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable health information
in electronic form for any business or research purpose related to the
substance of such information. '41 5 No distinctions should be made based
on the source of the health information.
The HIPAA Security Rule, as currently written, exempts databases of
de-identified records that meet the safe harbor standard from complying
with the specified security measures. 416 Because determined adversaries
may even be able to re-identify records that are de-identified in accor-
dance with safe harbor guidelines, 41 7 there is reason to question whether
this exemption is sound, and the matter merits further examination by
security experts.
To protect patient privacy, HHS will also need to enforce the HIPAA
Security Rule aggressively. Responsibility for enforcement is delegated
to the agency's Office of Civil Rights. 41 8 The regulations empower HHS
to investigate complaints of violations and to conduct self-initiated com-
pliance reviews of covered entities. 419 HHS states on its website that in
2008 and 2009 it conducted ten compliance reviews. 420 With the prolifer-
ation of EHR databases and EHR-based research projects, HHS will
need to augment its monitoring activities to prevent privacy abuses and
may require additional funding to do so. HHS will need to be ever-vigi-
lant in overseeing the security of large databases or federated systems
because security threats evolve rapidly over time and often cannot be
anticipated.
C. NOTICE AND EDUCATION
Effective protection of patient privacy through identity concealment,
robust oversight for all protocols, and enhanced security should consider-
ably alleviate anxiety about the potential risks of EHR-based research.
But, even these measures would not address concerns about the auton-
omy rights of data subjects. Some advocates may still favor consent as a
matter of principle or because they are concerned about the potential for
group stigmatization, objectionable outcomes, and commercial
exploitation. 421
This part proposes that notice and education replace consent in record-
based research studies. Notice and education, admittedly, will not enable
data subjects to make a choice about inclusion of their records in
databases. But they can empower data subjects in other ways. In a dem-
415. Id. at 360.
416. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining "protected health information" as "individually
identifiable health information"); 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (establishing that the Security Rule
applies to "electronic protected health information").
417. See supra Part III.B.l.b.ii.
418. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Security Rule Enforcement, HHS.Gov, http://
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/cmsenforcemain.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2011) [hereinafter Security Rule Enforcement].
419. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.306, 160.308.
420. Security Rule Enforcement, supra note 418.
421. See supra Part III.B.2.
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ocratic society, an educated public can effectively dismantle policies that
are objectionable. The democratic political system can bring change by
fostering communication with elected representatives, permitting refer-
enda, or ultimately using elections to replace government officials.
Therefore, notice and education, like consent, can promote autonomy
and respect for persons.
1. Notice
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires that health care providers notify pa-
tients that their health data might be used in some instances without their
consent. 422 Permissible uses include disclosure of information for treat-
ment, payment, health care operations, public health initiatives, law en-
forcement, and other purposes.42 3 But de-identified information is not
covered by the privacy regulations,424 so the Privacy Rule does not entitle
patients to any notice regarding research uses of data without
identifiers. 425
We propose expanding the HIPAA Privacy Rule notice requirement to
apply to all research uses. For research using identifiable records, notice
should replace requests for patient authorization, and notices should also
explain that authorized investigators might access patient information in
de-identified form. Health care providers whose EHRs may be available
to researchers through any venue and in any format should be obligated
to furnish patients with a notice that describes in general terms how and
under what circumstances their data might be used.
The notice should be provided in written form and also be discussed
verbally with patients by either a physician or a knowledgeable nurse.
Notice should be supplied to patients at least once by each health care
provider, such as the doctor, hospital, laboratory, etc., whose EHR will be
used for research purposes.
The notice should briefly explain the benefits of observational studies
and the potential to determine the comparative effectiveness of treat-
ments and achieve medical advances that will improve health care out-
comes for all. If applicable, it should also explain that no individually
identifiable data will be disclosed to researchers. These explanations
should be written in simple language that is accessible to an average
reader.426 In addition, the notice could acknowledge that research can
ultimately lead to commercial profits that are not shared with data
422. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520.
423. Id. §§ 164.506(c), 164.512.
424. Id. § 164.514.
425. If individually identifiable information will be disclosed to researchers, the covered
entity must currently obtain patient authorization in advance and cannot merely provide
notice. Id. § 164.508(b)(3)(i).
426. According to experts, the average reading comprehension level in the United
States is at most an eighth grade level. See What Is Health Literacy?, PARTNERSHIP FOR
CLEAR HEALTH COMM., http://www.npsf.org/pchc/health-literacy.php (last visited Nov. 2,
2011); Comprehension and Reading Level, INFORMATICs REV., http://www.informatics-re-
view.com/FAQ/reading.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) ("Research tells us that to commu-
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subjects.427
2. Public Education Initiatives
It would be naive to assume that the public will automatically embrace
a policy allowing researchers to access de-identified EHR information
without patient consent. Those generally resistant to federal initiatives as
manifestations of "big government" and as infringing upon individual au-
tonomy may be very vocal in their opposition and gain support from sig-
nificant segments of the population. The media may also be complicit in
fueling public discontent. 428 In the 1990s, President Clinton's efforts to
achieve health care reform were derailed by opposition from conserva-
tives, libertarians, and the health care industry with the help of a highly
effective "Harry and Louise" television advertisement. 429 In 2009, as the
country debated the merits of President Obama's health care reform initi-
ative, the idea that the government would utilize "death panels" to ration
care gained surprising traction.430
To gain public trust, promoters of comparative effectiveness and other
EHR-based research initiatives should launch their own public education
campaign. 431 This responsibility should be shared by HHS, private re-
search institutions, and highly respected professional organizations, such
as the American Medical Association. Educational messages can take
the form of public service announcements and news stories through me-
dia outlets such as television, radio, medical websites, and e-mail. Re-
searchers should also distribute updates concerning ongoing research
projects and their outcomes to the media so that the public can remain
apprised of the uses to which EHRs are put and the new knowledge that
is acquired as a result. The costs of educational initiatives can be covered,
at least in part, through user fees charged to commercial research organi-
zations that apply for access to EHR databases or federated systems. 432
In addition, local researchers could conduct community meetings to ed-
ucate the public and address concerns about EHR-based research. A
similar approach is used when investigators seek a waiver of informed
consent for research regarding emergency care in circumstances in which
obtaining consent will be impossible. 433 The federal regulations require
nicate effectively with a general audience in the U.S., we need to write at a 6th-8th grade
reading level.").
427. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
428. Victor R. Fuchs & Arnold Milstein, The $640 Billion Question-Why Does Cost-
Effective Care Diffuse So Slowly?, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1985, 1986 (2011) (stating that
the media "is the principal source" of misunderstandings about "who really pays for health
care" and "the relative benefit of clinical interventions").
429. Natasha Singer, Harry and Louise Return, with a New Message, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2009, at B3, available at http:/Iwww.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/business/media/
17adco.html.
430. Earl Blumenauer, My Near Death Panel Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2009, at
WK12.
431. IOM REPORT, supra note 9, at 144.
432. See supra notes 401-05 and accompanying text.
433. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2011).
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public disclosure of the project and consultation with community repre-
sentatives in the area from which the subjects will be drawn.434 Similar
meetings could be conducted in public libraries, community centers, and
other easily accessible locations to discuss EHR-based observational
studies for which consent will not be sought. These meetings would not
be consultations that seek input from community members but would be
an opportunity for the public to interact in person with researchers and
gain an in-depth understanding of record-based research.
3. The Benefits of Notice and Education
A notice mandate and public education initiatives would go far beyond
the current regulatory mandates with respect to de-identified data. So
long as health care providers do not disclose personally identifiable infor-
mation to researchers, neither the Common Rule nor the HIPAA Privacy
Rule requires that data subjects receive any information at all about stud-
ies.435 Health care providers can thus submit data that meet the HIPAA
safe harbor provision's requirements to a research database without any
regulatory oversight, and they are free to leave data subjects in complete
ignorance of such research activities. 436
It is also noteworthy that the law does not require physicians to seek
patients' permission to create medical files in the first place. In addition,
providers do not ask patients to consent to the transition from paper
records to EHRs, even though computerized records can expose patients
to privacy breach risks that do not exist when records are limited to hard-
copy files that can be locked away in cabinets. 437 In fact, it is more likely
that privacy breaches will occur in clinical settings than in the generally
more focused and controlled setting of a research project that involves a
limited number of professionals who are dedicated to achieving accurate
study outcomes. 438
Notice and education will not empower data subjects to make choices
about inclusion of their records in observational studies. However, a
mandate that researchers share comprehensive and truthful information
with the public, together with intensified oversight, should prevent abuses
and exploitation of data subjects. Historically, such abuses occurred
when data subjects were vulnerable because of ignorance, poverty, or im-
prisonment. 439 In addition, notice and education will enable the public to
voice its concerns and influence research policies through the democratic
process.
434. Id. § 50.24(a)(7).
435. See supra Part II.B.
436. See supra Part II.B.
437. See supra Part III.B.l.a.
438. Breaches Affecting, supra note 129 (reporting large privacy breaches at various
health care entities).
439. See supra Part IV.A.
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D. ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT
DATA SUBJECT INTERESTS
In this final section we briefly review several laws that protect patients
from misuse of their data by third parties. In addition, we suggest a few
further interventions that could be implemented to minimize the risk of
harm to data subjects.
Federal and state laws address discrimination based on biological and
health-related factors. The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.440
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act prohibits employers and
health insurers from engaging in discrimination based on genetic informa-
tion.441 Many state legislatures have passed other anti-discrimination
laws.442 The statutory restrictions on how employers and insurers can use
health data may reduce the frequency or impact of privacy breaches be-
cause it could make health information less attractive to hackers or those
to whom they seek to sell their bounty.443 The efficacy of these laws de-
pends on a variety of factors, among which are judicial interpretation of
statutory provisions and robust administrative enforcement. 444 However,
the statutes' existence sends an important message to those who would be
inclined to subject the vulnerable to discrimination, deters at least some
misconduct, and provides potential remedies for aggrieved individuals. 445
There are additional steps that could protect data subjects against cer-
tain dignitary harms associated with record-based studies. Researchers
should be scrupulous and conscientious in reporting research results to
avoid group stigmatization. 446 As stated in Section 30 of the Helsinki
Declaration, authors are responsible for the accuracy and completeness
of their research outcome reports. 447 To illustrate, assume that research-
ers determine that a genetic abnormality exists across populations but is
somewhat more prevalent among individuals of a particular ancestry. In
interviews and publications, investigators must clearly communicate that
the genetic abnormality is not unique to a particular minority group and
accurately describe its prevalence variations. Neither the media nor re-
searchers should be tempted to generate sensationalist, misleading head-
lines that might receive public attention but be inflammatory and
damaging to a minority group.
440. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
441. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223,
122 Stat. 881 (2008).
442. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1488 (2011).
443. Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 305, 307 (discussing plaintiffs' low win rates in court and Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
444. Id. at 308-11, 314-16.
445. Id. at 307 (discussing the benefits of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
446. Hoffman, supra note 87, at 450-54.
447. DECLARATrION OF HELSINKI, supra note 191, § 30.
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The problem of offensive outcomes448 could be partially addressed
through regulatory intervention. Regulations could prohibit investigators
from undertaking designated types of studies that are particularly contro-
versial without data subject consent even if researchers will see only de-
identified information. For example, consent could be required for stud-
ies that focus directly on facilitating abortion. This approach would have
to be limited to a very small number of study categories because it will be
costly and burdensome and could threaten the integrity of research
projects through selection bias.449 However, it may need to be consid-
ered to avoid public outcries and resistance to the EHR database re-
search enterprise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Individual interests in privacy and autonomy may conflict with society's
need for the best possible research outcomes. This Article has sought to
balance competing goals and values, and it has proposed a multi-faceted
approach to maximize research opportunities and to protect the valid in-
terests of data subjects.
The traditional autonomy-focused model is inappropriate for large-
scale, record-based research enabled by EHR technology. Instead, the
research ethics framework must shift to emphasize the common good in
noninterventional research. This conceptual change must be combined
with a variety of measures that will replace informed consent and effec-
tively safeguard patient privacy and other dignitary interests. These in-
clude: (1) the development of research techniques that yield adequate
data but conceal patient identifiers from researchers; (2) ethics board
oversight for all record-based studies, including those using de-identified
data; (3) scrupulous attention to the security of databases and revision of
the HIPAA Security Rule; and (4) notice and educational initiatives.
In July 2011 HHS issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) titled "Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Pro-
tections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambi-
guity for Investigators. ' 450 The ANPRM represents the first effort to
modernize the research regulations in over two decades, and it generated
nearly 1,100 comments during the first comment period, which ended on
October 26, 2011.451 It is unclear when the new rule will be finalized or
what its contents will be, but the process is likely to be lengthy. 452 In the
meantime, we hope that regulators will consider the concerns we raise.
448. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
449. See supra Part IV.D.
450. 76 Fed. Reg. 44512 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46,
160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
451. Jeannie Baumann, Human Subject Protection: OHRP Commended for Proposed
Changes to Common Rule; Some Areas Questioned, 10 MED. RES. L. POL'Y REP. (BNA)
723, 723 (Nov. 2, 2011).
452. Id.
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Observational research involving EHR databases is not without some
risk of privacy violations or other dignitary harms, and these should not
be ignored. But with appropriate interventions, the risks can be mini-
mized. Health information technology creates the potential for unprece-
dented scientific discoveries and dramatic improvements in human
health. Society must not squander this opportunity.
